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History and the human experience are inextricably linked to the climate and ecology of our 
planet. Often overlooked by modern-day contemporaries, infectious diseases have impacted 
societies across the world for millennia. My paper, “Politics of Plague:  Ancient Epidemics and 
Their Impact on Society,” examines the four major plagues that wrought immense destruction 
across the ancient Mediterranean world:  the Plague of Athens (430 BCE), the Antonine Plague 
(165 CE), the Plague of Cyprian (250 CE), and the Justinianic Plague (541 CE). The social, 
political, economic, and religious changes caused by these epidemics were so severe and lasting 
that they have led some scholars to conclude that their outbreaks ultimately contributed to the 
downfall of the affected societies. My paper—the culmination of more than two months of 
intensive research and analysis—makes a distinct contribution to existing scholarly research by 
highlighting the reverberations of major epidemics throughout the ancient world. Moreover, my 
analysis of these plagues and their impact on affected societies offers a thought-provoking lens 
through which to consider our own circumstances amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.  
My research, which was independently undertaken as a Pomona-sponsored RAISE project 
during the summer of 2020, was conducted primarily online. Sheltering at home, I journeyed deep 
into the ancient world through the online portal of The Claremont Colleges Library, which granted 
me access to a dazzling array of online databases, scholarly articles, scientific research, and 
primary source translations. In a COVID-free world, I would have delighted in the opportunity to 
spend my summer in the sunny tranquility of The Claremont Colleges Library’s solarium, 
meandering between the stacks in pursuit of scholarly monographs and encyclopedias. However—
unable to access the library’s physical collection during the pandemic—my research became 
confined to the digital realm. I began by compiling a preliminary list of primary and secondary 
source materials for each ancient plague.  
Based on the recommendation of my advisor (Pomona Prof. Benjamin Keim), the first 
resource I consulted was L’Annee Philologique, a Classics bibliography database. In L’Annee, I 
searched for keywords pertaining to each plague (e.g., the particular disease, and the names of 
rulers, doctors, and other individuals contemporary) and recorded the citations for the various 
ancient and modern texts it retrieved. After referencing L’Annee to create a preliminary list of 
sources to investigate further, I utilized the general search engine on The Claremont Colleges 
Library website to locate and download specific titles. 
Before deciding whether to add any secondary source to the research notes used for 
outlining my paper, I skimmed through each source to (1) evaluate the quality of the writing 
(noting the author(s) and publisher, and observing the authors’ writing style), (2) assess the 
author’s use of sources, and (3) establish its relevance to my research project. In the case of news 
articles and sources retrieved through Google, it was necessary to employ particular scrutiny, as 
they were unlikely to have been vetted to the same extent as articles retrieved through The 
Claremont Colleges Library database. Specifically, I investigated: (i) how well-established a given 
author was in their field, (ii) whether or not the work was published by a well-known university 
press or publishing house, and (iii) how frequently the source had been cited by other authors. 
Once I determined that a source was both reliable and relevant, I read it carefully, recording 
important information and noting citations to other sources to examine in greater depth. Using my 
library login, I also searched in JSTOR, Cambridge Core, Google Scholar, Britannica 
Online, Digital Loeb Classical Library, Open Library of Humanities, and Oxford Research 
Encyclopedias for plague-related keywords. These databases revealed a wealth of secondary 
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sources to consult, allowing me to explore a vast array of topics—from analyses of Pericles’ 
political rhetoric to surveys of ancient coinage revealing agricultural and economic crises in the 
2nd century Nile Delta.  
The pandemic-induced limitations on other activities last summer provided me with an 
unforeseen and unprecedented opportunity to engage with primary and secondary sources to an 
extent that would not have been achievable during the school year alongside a full course-load. I 
divided my research process and writing into six segments: the first week was dedicated to 
familiarizing myself with the key facts relating to each plague and its aftermath; the following 
eight weeks were devoted to examining each plague in more detail and writing about it 
(approximately two weeks per plague); and the final two weeks were consumed with synthesizing 
relevant information, reflecting on common themes and critical differences, and considering the 
ramifications for our society amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Over the course of 11 weeks, 
my RAISE project provided me with the fascinating opportunity to read, analyze, and immerse 
myself in more than 100 sources, written by authors from a wide range of perspectives, places, and 
periods—the bulk of which I was able to access through the online resources and databases of The 
Claremont Colleges Library! 
My research, writing, and analytical skills improved tremendously by being challenged 
daily for more than two months. Examining maps, scholarly monographs, articles, and lectures 
brought the ancient world to life. Poring over eyewitness accounts from politicians, scientists, and 
clergy vividly describing each outbreak, I became lost in their universe. Their emotions and 
experiences 1,500 to 2,500 years ago—loss, grief, and uncertainty—were reminiscent of 
those encountered by humans today amid the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. Synthesizing 
the vast quantities of information I gathered into my paper consistently challenged me to identify 
and distill the key insights and data from each source. It took multiple rounds of outlining and 
editing to construct a narrative arc that describes the unique facts surrounding each ancient plague, 
identifies common themes and critical differences among them, and reflects on parallels and 
implications for our time. Despite the struggles I encountered, this experience has only confirmed 
my excitement about pursuing a history major. I am proud of the final work product:  a scholarly 





















The four major plagues that struck the ancient Mediterranean—the Plague of Athens (430 BCE), the 
Antonine Plague (165 CE), the Plague of Cyprian (250 CE), and the Justinianic Plague (541 CE)—claimed 
the lives of thousands, or even millions, of people.  These epidemics impelled governments to fracture and 
rebuild, induced the rise and fall of different religions and religious practices, altered military strategies and 
outcomes, and forced ancient societies to re-examine their structures, values, and inequalities.  Such 
extreme mortalities profoundly impacted each affected society, triggering severe social, political, economic, 
religious, and military changes that ultimately altered the course of history, and contributed to the collapse 
of two of the ancient world’s greatest empires:  Athens and Rome. 
 
The Plague of Athens:  For the first half of the fifth century BCE, Athens stood as the largest and most 
cosmopolitan city-state in Greece.  When Plague struck in 430 BCE, it took mere weeks for Athenian 
culture and values to shatter, and for lawlessness and disorder to erupt.  As Athens descended into chaos, 
individuals capitalized on disaster to advance their personal and political interests.  Social unrest, 
demagogy, and political turmoil ensued.  Moreover, by depleting Athenian manpower, the Plague 
contributed to Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, a loss which significantly diminished Athens’ 
power across the Aegean. 
 
The Antonine Plague:  At the height of power in 165 CE, the Roman Empire was home to more than 75 
million people and was one of the most prosperous civilizations the world had ever seen.  The Antonine 
Plague decimated towns and peoples across the Roman world, its spread amplified by urbanization, high 
population density, and vast trade networks.  It demolished Rome’s army:  Roman triumph in the Parthian 
campaign of 166 would be Rome’s sole military success for nearly 50 years.  Economic struggles—initially 
caused by the Plague’s death toll—precipitated agricultural crisis, prompting further economic decline.  
Political strife, poor leadership, and frequent emperor turnover exacerbated unrest and uncertainty for the 
future of the empire. 
 
The Plague of Cyprian:  Under the prudent leadership of rulers from the Severan Dynasty, the Roman 
Empire slowly recovered from the Antonine Plague.  Yet less than a century later, the Cyprian Plague 
arrived, attacking its victims mercilessly and with little reprieve for nearly two decades.  Rome’s economy 
fluctuated wildly.  Attempts at currency reform backfired, causing Rome’s silver currency system to crash.  
With Rome’s military forces debilitated by Plague, the state faced enemies on nearly every frontier, 
eventually losing hegemony along a number of fronts.  In the 50 years following the outbreak of the Cyprian 
Plague, Rome was ruled by more than 20 emperors.  Barbarian invasions, economic decline, civil wars, 
climate change, and the Cyprian Plague all played a role in what is referred to as the “first fall of Rome” at 
the end of the third century CE. 
 
The Justinianic Plague:  After the Justinianic Plague spread across the Mediterranean world from 541-544, 
it became endemic in the region, flaring up in various waves for the next two centuries.  Worsening climate 
conditions—including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and a comet collision—resulted in agricultural 
crises and famine.  As recurring waves of plague and natural disaster reshaped the landscape of the empire, 
traditional social order collapsed, giving way to hysteria.  Ambitious programs of reform and military 
conquest commenced prior to the outbreak of Plague had depleted the resources of the empire.  Rome’s 
military was greatly diminished by the Plague’s death toll and the state’s inability to pay its soldiers.  Unable 
to defend the frontiers of the empire against outside intruders, the Roman Empire was spliced into smaller 
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 The ancient Greek and Roman empires wielded immense power and controlled enormous 
swaths of land and sea across the Mediterranean.  These illustrious civilizations—and their 
monumental advancements in technology, trade, culture, politics, and thought—have continued 
to command the awe of humans living more than two millennia later.  Many marvel at the great 
texts of ancient authors, historians, and philosophers, as well as the remarkable achievements of 
the ancient Greeks and Romans, ranging from naval ships and international trade routes to 
agricultural advancements and urbanization.  The legacy created by these civilizations and their 
greatest minds has endured to today.   
Often lost on present-day observers, however, is the extent to which daily life and the 
human experience of the ancients differed from that of the modern era.  One critical difference is 
the extent to which life in the ancient world was riddled with infectious disease.  Diseases such 
as malaria, tuberculosis, measles, typhoid, leprosy, smallpox, bubonic plague, and other acute 
diarrheal diseases were hyperendemic in many places.  Studies in archaeology, economics, and 
anthropology evince that the ancient Roman world “teemed with infection.”1  Due to the 
frequency with which infectious disease—and other health conditions we now have the tools to 
treat—claimed lives in the ancient world, the average life expectancy in the second century CE 
was barely more than 20 years.2  While ancient Roman annalists acknowledged the ever-looming 
possibility of a fatal epidemic,3 prior to the fifth century BCE most infectious diseases remained 
endemic and were confined to limited regional areas, primarily afflicting populations in close 
 
1 Hanna, “The Route to Crisis: Cities, Trade, and Epidemics of the Roman Empire,” 1. 
2 Sheidel, “Roman Wellbeing and the Economic Consequences of the ‘Antonine Plague,’” 3-4. 
3 Duncan-Jones, “The Impact of the Antonine Plague,” 109-110. 
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geographical proximity to the disease pools.  And, over time, many individuals began to develop 
immunity to the diseases that commonly afflicted their area.   
Outbreaks began to lose their geographic limitations in the mid-fifth century BCE.  Under 
the rule of ambitious leaders enamored with large-scale territorial conquest, accompanied by 
technological innovation and increased trade, a greater number of individuals began to travel 
further and further across the Mediterranean world than ever before.  Alongside the soldiers, 
diplomats, merchants, and goods traversing across the Mediterranean seas, traveled infectious 
diseases.  Infectious diseases that had previously been confined to particular areas were soon 
introduced to non-immune populations across the empire, spurring severe epidemics on an 
unprecedented scale.  As commerce created abounding opportunities for jobs and wealth, trade 
hubs near ports across the Mediterranean had become increasingly urbanized.  Larger numbers of 
individuals living in closer quarters than ever before also exacerbated the spread of infectious 
disease.  
Changing human travel and migration patterns and urbanization were not the only 
ingredients that led to a few instances of particularly severe outbreaks of infectious diseases in 
the ancient Greek and Roman world, beginning with the Plague of Athens in 430 BCE.  While 
often overlooked, the earth’s climate and ecology affect the core of the human experience, both 
in ancient times and today.  Different climatic epochs, fluctuating temperatures, volcanic 
eruptions, and meteorites all affected the daily lives of people in the ancient world.  Moreover, 
such drastic climatic events caused “nature’s finely balanced ecosystem relationships [to] 
change.”4  In response to changing climate conditions and changes in food availability, animal 
species often adopted new and irregular migration patterns in search of food.  Epidemics or 
 
4 Heeney, “Ebola - The Plague of 2014/2015,” 14. 
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epizootics (epidemics within an animal population, which, in some cases can jump from animals 
to humans) can be caused by such sudden changes in animal behavior.  It is estimated that nearly 
75 percent of human infectious diseases originate from animals.5  Thus, while favorable climate 
conditions aided the infrastructure and economic growth of ancient Greek and Roman cities, 
changing climate conditions played a role in their undoing, as climate influenced the appearance, 
frequency, and severity of infectious disease outbreaks.  Human history operates on a changing 
platform of nature, and climate variability throughout time has shown the power to either 
stabilize or destabilize a given society. 
 The four major plagues that struck the ancient Mediterranean—the Plague of Athens (430 
BCE), the Antonine Plague (165 CE), the Plague of Cyprian (250 CE), and the Justinianic Plague 
(541 CE)—claimed the lives of thousands, or in some cases, millions, of people.  Such extreme 
mortalities profoundly impacted each affected society, triggering severe social, political, 
economic, religious, and military changes that ultimately altered the course of history.  These 
epidemics impelled governments to fracture and rebuild, induced the rise and fall of different 
religions and religious practices, altered military strategies and outcomes, and forced ancient 
societies to re-examine their structures, values, and inequalities. 
 There are only a limited number of extant accounts of these ancient epidemics from 
authors contemporary with such outbreaks.  Deciphering the surviving fragments of ancient 
writers’ work poses several challenges.  First, ancient authors are notorious for their hyperbole, 
prompting many modern historians to question whether or not their observations—particularly 
their numerical estimates—should be taken at face value.  Moreover, as their accounts were 
originally written in Latin or ancient Greek, translating the authors’ accounts into English has 
 
5 Heeney, “Ebola - The Plague of 2014/2015,” 11. 
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also been difficult.  Multiple interpretations exist for terms ancient authors used to describe 
physical symptoms of a given disease, which has in some cases made it difficult for modern 
scholars to identify the disease that caused a particular plague.6  
 Modern technology has greatly expanded our knowledge of the timeline, events, and 
destruction caused by each plague.  Archaeological excavations throughout the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean have found Syrian villages nearly uninhabited after an earthquake and 
outbreak of the Cyprian Plague, and unearthed papyri detailing census, taxation, and land 
ownership data in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague in Egypt.  In recent decades, DNA 
analysis has helped to fill gaps in our knowledge and identify the particular disease responsible 
for an outbreak.  Using dental pulp of individuals buried in areas believed to have been afflicted 
by disease, scientists have been able to run DNA analyses to test for the presence of a particular 
virus or bacterium.7  Acquiring these ancient specimens poses its own challenge, as many mass 
graves described in surviving historical records are located in or near major modern-day cities, 
which often makes it difficult—if not impossible—to obtain permission to excavate these sites.  
However, this technique has already been successfully employed in rural areas:  in 2013, 
scientists excavated a cemetery dating from the sixth century CE in Aschheim, Germany, and 
found traces of the bacterium responsible for the Bubonic plague (Yersinia pestis), which  
confirmed scholars’ theory that the Bubonic plague was the disease responsible for the 
Justinianic Plague.   
Our knowledge of these four major ancient epidemics comes from a variety of sources:  
(1) ancient authors contemporary with the disease event, (2) ancient historians writing a few 
centuries after the disease event, discussing the account of an author contemporary with the 
 
6 Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 1-3. 
7 Ibid, 2-3. 
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outbreak, (3) archaeological findings, (4) paleomicrobiological findings, and (5) efforts of other 
modern historians to synthesize the four aforementioned sources.  It is thanks to this 
collaborative and highly interdisciplinary effort that we now have a wealth of information 
concerning the timeline, reach, and symptoms of each major epidemic, as well as the social, 























THE PLAGUE OF ATHENS (430 BCE) 
 
Background 
For the first half of the fifth century BCE, Athens was a force to be reckoned with.  At its 
height, the city of Athens stood as the largest and most cosmopolitan city-state in all of Greece, 
controlling most of the Aegean coastline.  While much of Athens’ energy and attention from 500 
to 480 BCE was directed towards thwarting Persian attempts to invade Greece, the end of the 
Persian Wars in 478 BCE marked the beginning of an era of Athenian dominance in Greece and 
across the known Mediterranean.  An important decision that contributed to Greek victory in the 
Persian Wars was the formation of the Delian League, an association of more than 150 Greek 
city-states scattered across the Aegean coast, that, under Athenian leadership, united to defeat the 
Persians.  
After peace had been made with Persia, what began as an alliance of independent Greek 
city-states soon became a quasi-Athenian Empire.  Athens took control of the League, continued 
to collect hefty taxes from its member states, and relocated the League’s treasury from its 
original location in Delos to Athens.  Athenian politicians used the League’s funds to bolster 
their city’s economy, funneling tax revenue into infrastructure projects, including the Athenian 
Acropolis and the Parthenon.8  To the Spartans, a rival Greek superpower at the time, as well as 
other members of the Delian League, it became increasingly clear that Athens was seeking to 
consolidate power into an Athenian empire, and using the money it had collected to maintain its 
status as the dominant naval power in Greece.  In 431 BCE, Sparta and a number of its 
Peloponnesian allies declared war on Athens, and the Peloponnesian War commenced.  Given 
 
8 Cartwright, “Delian League.” 
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the immense manpower and resources that Athens commanded, as well as its status as a naval 
superpower, the city’s prospects for winning the Peloponnesian War appeared quite strong.9  
After a successful campaigning season in Megarid, the Athenians finished the first year of the 
war in high spirits.10  Having learned that Sparta planned to invade Attica, Athenian leader 
Pericles sought to protect its citizens from possible attack.  He moved many residents from the 
suburbs into the city so that the Athenians would be protected within the confines of the 
Themistoclean walls, which guarded the city and provided a fortified connection with the port of 
Piraeus.  Protected access to the port of Piraeus, which was located nine kilometers from the city, 
would ensure that Athens could continue to access all the food and other resources it required for 
those seeking shelter within city walls, while Athenian soldiers would be able to continue with 
their naval campaigns against the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies.  Every possible 
scenario appeared to have been accounted and planned for.  In a speech Pericles gave before his 
soldiers, he confidently proclaimed that Athens was “ready to encounter every legitimate 
danger.”11 
 
Outbreak of Plague and Symptoms 
 While the measures implemented by Pericles and other Athenian leaders were effective in 
protecting Athens from the enemy outside the Themistoclean walls, a more formidable threat 
emerged from within the city’s walls.  The Great Plague of 430 BCE was an unforeseen enemy 
that the Athenians were unprepared to defeat.  Widely believed to have originated in North 
Africa, the plague arrived in Athens during the second year of the Peloponnesian War, first 
 
9 Soupios, “Impact of the Plague in Ancient Greece,” 49. 
10 Joho, “The Revival of the Funeral Oration and the Plague in Thucydides Books 6–7,” 18-19. 
11 Thucydides 2.6. This and all subsequent translations from Thucydides’ History are by Richard Crawley. 
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striking the Athenian port town of Piraeus.12  The plague quickly found its way into the city of 
Athens, where it spread like wildfire, suddenly attacking people otherwise believed to be in good 
health.  The Athenian leaders’ decision to pile residents from the suburbs into the city proved to 
be a catalyst as it created living conditions conducive for person-to-person transmission.  During 
the Spartan siege, the city of Athens’ population is estimated to have tripled or quadrupled—
from 100,000-150,000 pre-war residents to 300,000-400,000 during the war, which resulted in a 
very high population density (between 25,000 to 100,000 people per square mile) in Athens.13 
 The virgin soil epidemic attacked individuals regardless of age, sex, or race, and had a 
mortality rate estimated between 25 and 33 percent.14  The only firsthand account of the plague 
that has been recovered is that of the Greek historian Thucydides, a wealthy Athenian general 
and political critic who was living in Athens while the plague ravaged the city, who fell ill to it 
himself.  According to Thucydides, the onset of illness was nearly immediate:  healthy 
individuals were “all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head,” and their eyes became 
red and inflamed.15  These symptoms were soon followed by abnormally foul breath, sneezing, 
and hoarseness, “after which the pain reached the chest,” producing a hard cough.16  Later, those 
infected were overcome by an upset stomach, regurgitating bile “of all kinds,” and their skin 
broke out into “small pustules and ulcers,” which left gnarly scars and marred the skin of those 
who managed to survive.17  In many cases, the sick became unbearably hot, reporting sensations 
of internal burning, and were unable to wear any clothing comfortably.18  Many were struck by 
 
12 Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 8. 
13 Martínez, “Political Consequences of the Plague of Athens,” 139. 
14 Mitchell-Boyask, Plague and the Athenian Imagination, 117. 





episodes of dementia.19  Approximately a week after contracting the disease, most infected 
individuals experienced bouts of diarrhea, which severely dehydrated and weakened them.20  
Often, it was this dehydration that weakened the sick and brought them to the brink of death.21  
Many of those who managed to recover after this point experienced permanent brain damage and 
memory loss.22 
 
Modern Medical Assessment 
 Using modern technology and analytical tools, scientists in recent decades have sought to 
identify the type of disease that ravaged Athens.  They have concluded that bubonic plague, 
typhoid fever, smallpox, measles, or endemic typhus are the most likely candidates.  At present, 
there remains some disagreement as to which of these diseases caused the Athenian plague.  
Cheston B. Cunha and Burke A. Cunha suggest that the symptoms Thucydides described align 
closely with measles or endemic typhus.23  It is important to note that the strain of measles that 
would have struck Athens in 430 BCE is not the same strain present in modern societies, which 
has become less virulent due to widespread vaccination.24  Among non-immune populations, the 
mortality rate of measles approaches twenty-five percent, and the symptoms patients report are 
similar to those described by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War.  This theory 
is supported by a measles outbreak that occurred on the Fiji Islands—home to a largely non-






23 Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 6. 
24 Ibid, 7. 
25 Measles & Rubella Initiative, “Fiji and Measles: From Devastation to Elimination.” 
15 
 Endemic typhus remains another likely possibility for the Athenian plague, as it can be 
carried by lice, and historically has often struck during times when large populations were 
crammed into confined spaces.26  According to the Cunhas, it is plausible that an individual with 
endemic-typhus carrying lice may have entered Athens through the port of Piraeus and infected 
the city.27  Robert J. Littman also believes that the Athenian plague most likely was caused by 
endemic typhus.  Using mathematical models, Littman and his team modeled each possible 
infection and its infection rates to predict how long it would take each disease to spread through 
a city like ancient Athens, as well as the duration for which it would likely remain endemic.28  
From this study, Littman concluded that the plague likely was caused by typhus or a typhus-like 
disease.29 
 
Timeline and Mortality Estimates 
 The plague remained endemic in Athens for nearly five years:  after its initial wave in 
May of 430 BCE, it reappeared in 429, claiming the life of Greek leader Pericles, and then struck 
for a third time in the winter of 427/6 BCE.  The plague’s cumulative death toll is believed to be 
between 75,000 and 100,000.30  The immediate effect of the plague on the Athenian way of life 
was calamitous; it stretched the city’s resources thin, and killed the relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances of many.  Yet the longer-term consequences of the plague extended far beyond the 
lives it claimed:  the chaos, disorder, and social unrest that were triggered by the outbreak would 
profoundly shape Athenian morals, religion, politics, and military conquest for decades to come.  
 
26 Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 8. 
27 Ibid, 8. 
28 Littman, “The Plague of Athens: Epidemiology and Paleopathology,” 459. 
29 Ibid, 459. 




Mere months before the Plague struck Athens, Pericles gave his now-famed Funeral 
Oration in honor of the Athenian men who had lost their lives fighting in the Peloponnesian War.  
The entirety of Pericles’ speech has been recounted by Thucydides in History of the 
Peloponnesian War.  Before the largest Athenian army ever to be assembled in one body,31 
Pericles praised the deceased soldiers’ bravery and loyalty to Athens, and emphasized the 
greatness of Athenian culture, knowledge, and democracy that heralded Athens as a model for 
the rest of the world.  Pericles applauded the distinct traits admired, and values held, by Athenian 
citizens, such as intelligence, resoluteness in action, belief in the equality of political rights, a 
balance of private life with public duty, an appreciation of freedoms, and respect for authority.32  
Highlighting the uniqueness of the Athenian constitution, Pericles proclaimed that “Our 
constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than 
imitators to ourselves.”33  Moreover, Pericles extolled that “Athens alone of her contemporaries 
is found when tested to be greater than her reputation,” and that “the admiration of the present 
and succeeding ages will be ours.”34  Thus, while respectfully offering his condolences and 
honoring the men who valiantly fought for the glory of Athens, Pericles simultaneously touted 
the hallmarks of Athenian values and conduct that enabled Athenian democracy to flourish and 
serve as an inspiration for civilizations around the known world.  
 However, “almost in the same breath,” Thucydides evinced the fleetingness of the 
Athenian ideals Pericles puts forth in his speech, for his account of the plague’s outbreak 
 
31 Joho, “The Revival of the Funeral Oration and the Plague in Thucydides Books 6–7,” 18-19. 
32 Ibid, 20. 
33 Thucydides 2.6 
34 Ibid. 
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immediately follows his account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration.35  The ferocity with which the 
plague attacked individuals regardless of age, sex, nationality, social status, or piety, suddenly 
made life feel ephemeral.  It did not spare the doctors or others who tried to help the sick.  As the 
plague traveled around the city like a wildfire, the mentality of the populace began to shift.  
Many individuals began to neglect laws, religious rites, and proper burial practices, engaging in 
reckless behavior without fear of consequences.36  As people died ubiquitously, the streets 
became “strewn with heaps of homeless unattended dead and dying.”37  Men resolved to spend 
their money quickly and cherish their last days, “regarding their lives and riches as things alike 
of a day.”38  Thucydides wrote that “as the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what 
was to become of them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or profane.”39  
Widespread moral decline in Athens ensued, as individuals came to fear neither god nor law and 
did not expect to live long enough to stand trial for their offenses.  
 More disconcerting, however, was the fact that the moral decay precipitated by the 
outbreak of plague did not dissipate along with it.  Modern scholars have argued that the plague 
mounted a long-lasting “frontal assault on the Periclean ideal.”40  Law turned to lawlessness, 
order was perverted to disorder, honor was nowhere to be found, and individuals ceased to act in 
the interest of the greater public and instead began to act only in self-interest.  The progressive 
collapse of Athenian values in the years that followed was recounted by Thucydides in the third 
book of his History of the Peloponnesian War, in which he described the “collapse of the three 
fundamental Greek institutions:  kinship, human law, and divine law.”41  His description of poor 
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leadership and declining values in the subsequent books serve as further evidence that the plague 
had brought about a new Athenian environment and mindset that would ultimately unravel “the 
spiritual tapestry of Greece’s greatest city.”42  The plague’s effective “demoralization of 
Athenian society”43 was fraught with consequences:  as J. F. D. Shrewsbury writes, “the 
pestilence, in effect, engendered a social and political canker which continued to fester long after 
the immediate effect of its morality had subsided.”44  Moral decay, fused with poor leadership, 
exacerbated a multitude of civic problems in Athens.  Divisions widened between the aristocracy 
and working classes, old money and the nouveau riche, and traditional and “new” politicians.  
Social conflict, class tensions, and an increased sense of nativism ruled the day.  Arguably, the 




 Unlike many other historians of the ancient world, Thucydides did not offer a divine 
interpretation of the plague.  However, he did describe the impact on religion:  as the plague 
attacked both the pious and the nonreligious alike, many individuals gave up hope and stopped 
praying to the gods.  Thucydides observed that “the only increase in religious activity was the 
popularization of the claim that the gods were punishing Athens with the disease,”45 as some 
attributed the perceived immunity of the Peloponnese from the plague to Apollo’s promise to 
assist the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War.46   
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 The Cult of Asclepius—the Greek god of medicine and healing—began to gain traction 
in Athens during the plague and in the decades that followed.  According to Robin Mitchell-
Boyask, the increased popularity of religion and worship of Asclepius can be explained by 
human response to tragedy—more specifically, the extreme loss of life from the plague which 
Athens had failed to combat.  He explains that “Just as tragedy encompasses both the optimistic 
and pessimistic visions of death, so too does it give expression to the belief in both kinds of 
medical therapy, the religious and the scientific.”47  While the Asclepius cult in Athens was 
likely founded by private citizens, as the movement gained traction, the polis soon overtook its 
administration.48  In 420 BCE, the Athenians celebrated Asclepius with an inaugural festival and 
with the construction of two major sanctuaries for healing and worship, one on the south slope of 
the Acropolis and the other in Piraeus.49  Some scholars have gone so far as to describe this 
uptick in religious practices as a social movement:  Harry Perlstadt writes that the rise of the Cult 
of Asclepius featured both “redemptive religious healing and a reformative political strategy.”50  
Widespread worship of Asclepius renewed religious healing practices that had been disrupted by 
the plague and the Peloponnesian War.  It can, however, be argued that a resurgence in religious 
practices may have been one of only a few benign outcomes of the plague, as the city of Athens 
largely remained in a state of moral, social, and political disarray.  
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Political Changes 
 In his Funeral Oration, Pericles had trumpeted how accepting Athens was of other 
cultures, claiming that Athenians “throw open [their] city to the world.”51  It is true that Athens 
attracted and welcomed many immigrants from other areas of Greece, however, even during 
Pericles’ reign, these immigrants were not entitled to the same rights as Athenian citizens.  In 
451 BCE, Pericles imposed an immigration law that restricted Athenian citizenship rights to 
individuals born of two Athenian citizens.52  This effectively reduced the political power of 
Metics (immigrants), as land ownership and jurorships were privileges restricted solely to 
Athenian citizens.53  Thus, while Athenian leaders were clearly implementing a nativist agenda 
prior to the outbreak of the plague, there is evidence to suggest that this movement and anti-
immigrant sentiment were exacerbated by the plague’s death toll, which may have shifted the 
demographic balance between citizens and Metics.54   
Pericles’ successors failed to make Athens a more accepting place or to increase the 
number of its citizens by allowing only wealthy Metics entry into the ranks of the Athenian 
citizenry.  Desperate to secure their already futile positions of power, Pericles’ successors instead 
elected to further restrict citizenship opportunities.  Metics who wished to become citizens were 
required to pay large sums of money to the Athenian government and were expected to devote 
the majority of their life to public service in Athens.55  Those lucky enough to ultimately acquire 
citizenship were granted the privilege late in life and were not permitted to confer such status 
upon their kin.56  The decades after the plague saw only further tightening of the restrictions 
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against Metics, which had begun in the 450s BCE, and Pericles’ immigration law was re-enacted 
in 403 BCE.57  Thus, the plague’s death toll stimulated an increasingly nativist sentiment among 
Athenian citizens and resulted in the decline of Metic status in Athens.  
Both Pericles’ death and the moral decline brought about by the plague debased Athenian 
leadership and politics.  As the “greatest statesmen of the era,”58 Pericles had led Athens with 
integrity, grace, and fair-mindedness until his death from the plague at the age of 65.  For as long 
as he was head of state, he pursued a “moderate and conservative policy” that was well-received 
by the public.59  Ancient sources, with near-complete unanimity, praise Pericles’ wisdom, 
courage, and incorruptibility.  Some modern scholars have asserted that Pericles’ death may be to 
blame for Athens’ downfall in the post-plague era:  M. A. Soupios contends that “In carrying off 
Pericles, the plague deprived Athens of the one man who had the courage and capacity to 
remonstrate the citizenry.”60 
 In the void of Pericles’ adept leadership, Athens suffered from “in-fighting, toxic politics, 
and selfish leaders” for years after the plague had run its course through the city.61  A host of 
demagogic politicians came into power in Athens in the post-Periclean era, such as Cleon, 
Alcibiades, Cleophon, and Hyperbolus.  These politicians did not lead in the interests of those 
who had elected them.  Instead, they acted in their own self-interest, drove the people “by 
creating enemies that [did] not exist,”62 manipulated the emotions of the populace, fear-
mongered, and relied on the use of inflammatory language and theatrical behavior to evince their 
rhetorical points.  Demagoguery feeds on exploitation, and the ancient demagogues sought to 
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create turmoil and social division to secure their positions of power at any cost.  Thucydides 
denounced the “host of blunders” each of Pericles’ successors generated in their attempts to 
“grasp […]  at supremacy,”63 and appeared deeply skeptical of the “new paradigm of fantasy 
politics”64 he believed Athens had adopted.  
 
Impact on Military 
 Despite being disadvantaged by a depletion of their armed forces, the Athenians 
continued to fight the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War for nearly twenty more years.  The 
adverse effects of new politicians’ poor leadership on Athenian civilians and military forces were 
exacerbated by the significant extent to which the plague had depleted Athenian manpower.  The 
plague had a high death toll among Athenian military forces:  the naval force, before Potidaea, 
lost approximately 25% of its manpower in just forty days after the outbreak of the plague,65 and 
the cumulative loss in manpower across the various waves of the plague amounted to 4,400 
hoplites and 300 cavalry.66  Given the labor-intensive nature of ancient warfare, such an extreme 
loss of manpower was problematic for the Athenians and placed them at a significant 
disadvantage in the Peloponnesian War.  
 A particularly stark example of how sharply Athenian political leadership had declined 
was the Sicilian Expedition, which some scholars have referred to as the “greatest military 
blunder” of the Peloponnesian War.67  In 415 BCE, Athenian leader Alcibiades, using his 
trademark seductive oratory tactics, managed to persuade the Athenian assembly to launch a 
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major military expedition against Syracuse—a Sicilian ally of the Peloponnesians—and thereby 
recklessly open a second front in the west.  Shortly thereafter, however, Alcibiades’ political 
opponents in Athens brought charges of sacrilege against him.68  Rather than remaining in 
Athens and attempting to combat the charges he faced, Alcibiades fled, leaving the Sicilian 
Expedition in the hands of a reluctant Nicias. 
 Instead of seizing the opportunity to exile somewhere along the Aegean coast, Alcibiades 
instead traveled to Sparta and divulged the Athenian’s plans to attack Syracuse.  Sparta 
immediately sent assistance to the Sicilians to bolster their military forces prior to the arrival of 
the Athenians.69  Athenian forces, unsuspecting and inadequately prepared, suffered a stunning 
defeat upon their arrival at Syracuse.70  The Peloponnesian War ultimately culminated in 
Athenian loss in 404 BCE, which further diminished Athens’ power across the Aegean.71  And, 
in 338 BCE—less than a century after the outbreak of the Plague—the city of Athens lost its 
independence and “superpower” status for good when Philip II of Macedon conquered the city 
along with the rest of Greece.  
 
Conclusion 
 Although it had taken Athens centuries of innovation, military campaigns, and diplomatic 
efforts to reach the apex of its prominence and glory, when the Plague struck in 430 BC, it took 
mere weeks for Athenian culture and values to shatter, and for lawlessness and disorder to erupt.  
While these unforeseen exogenous events appear to have quickly up-ended a society, the rapid 
disintegration of Athenian values has prompted some scholars to question (1) the veracity of 
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Pericles’ description of the Athenian people in his funeral oration (i.e., perhaps he ascribed 
characteristics and values to Athenians which many of them did not, in fact, embody), and (2) 
whether Thucydides may have embellished Pericles’ words in his account to emphasize the 
disparities between Athenian life pre and post-plague.  While it is important to examine the 
possible biases that have influenced modern interpretation of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, due to a 
lack of other surviving accounts, it may be impossible to discern the true state of Athenian moral 
values in the eras before and after the Plague of Athens.  
 Ancient authors concur that Pericles embodied the Athenian ideals he put forth in his 
Funeral Oration, and praise Pericles for his prudent and judicious leadership qualities.  But, 
given how quickly Athens unraveled after Pericles’ death, it is understandable why some have 
speculated whether or not his soldiers and Athenian civilians embodied such qualities to a 
comparable extent.  Clifford Orwin highlights the significance of hope (and the loss thereof), 
writing that “Political life depends on hopes and fears for the future, and therefore the 
expectation of one.”72  With nothing to either hope or fear for the future, men immerse 
themselves in pleasures “as depend only on themselves, but on themselves as transformed by 
their indifference to the future, and the godlike (if fleeting) impunity which this confers.”73  
Thus, it may alternatively be the case that many Athenian men embodied the great moral 
character Pericles proclaimed them to have, but that the arrant disruption caused by the plague 
made them lose hope for the future, degrading their behavior and values.  
 Hellmut Flashar asserts that “Thucydides’ goal is an ironic exposure of the tension 
between the true situation at Athens and the sugar-coated Periclean picture,”74 which suggests 
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that Thucydides’ stark contrast between the Funeral Oration and the outbreak of the plague were 
designed to call into question Pericles’ overly flattering description of Athenian values and 
behavior.  Tobias Joho expresses a more moderate stance, positing that “the character of Athens 
is not statically given, but constantly resituates itself along a spectrum, whose extreme points are 
marked by the Funeral Oration and the plague.”75  So, it is possible that the values and conduct 
of the Athenians pre and post-plague may have been less of a dichotomy than Thucydides makes 
them out to be, but instead resonate along a continuum.  
 It seems obvious that any great society, even at its zenith, is not entirely flawless—
Athens included.  While Athenian democracy, leadership, and knowledge flourished in the fifth 
century BCE, Athens was by no means utopian.  Certain social issues, such as the rights of 
immigrants and inequality between the wealthy and poor, were simply given less attention.  
Thus, the Plague of Athens both exacerbated existing social issues, while simultaneously 
creating a multitude of additional problems.  By claiming the life of one of Greece’s most 
extraordinary and well-liked leaders, degenerating Athenian values and morals, and—as a 
consequence—wreaking havoc on Athenian politics and military campaigns, the plague crippled 
a once-illustrious city that appeared destined for further greatness, and sent Athens spiraling 
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THE ANTONINE PLAGUE (165 CE) 
 
Background 
By the first century CE, Rome had become one of the largest and most prosperous 
civilizations the world had ever seen.  The city of Rome was home to more than one million 
inhabitants—the first and only western city to reach that size until London in the 1800s.76  The 
Roman Empire was an even more astonishing sight to behold:  in 165 AD, at the height of 
Rome’s power, it was home to more than 75 million people77 and encompassed an expansive 
area of land, stretching from the Middle East to the Iberian Peninsula, and from North Africa to 
Britain.  It was hardly hyperbolical for the Romans to call the Mediterranean mare nostrum; our 
sea.  
 The period from 80 BC to 180 CE is often referred to as the pax Romana, a golden era 
and high point of Roman civilization marked by a period of relative peace and prosperity 
throughout the empire.  Individuals from across the empire flocked to Rome, which had become 
“a place for thought, reasoning, and sharing ideas; an elite storehouse of commodities, 
entertainment, and scholarship.”78  Roman technology and innovation burgeoned and became a 
sight to behold, as did Rome itself, as it had become “a marvel of civil engineering,”79 home to 
grand architectural projects and aqueducts.  Culture and politics blossomed, and the late republic 
and early empire grew under the guidance of great leaders widely revered by the public, such as 
Antoninus Pius.  Pius’ rule from 138-161 CE was one of the most harmonious and successful in 
Roman history.  A poised and selfless leader, Antoninus Pius denounced luxury, pursued a 
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moderate economic policy, financed infrastructure projects, and even used his own money to 
purchase food and wine for the poor in times of need.80 
 Rome’s economy flourished under the rule of Pius and his predecessors.  The Roman 
Climate Optimum (200 BCE - 150 CE) had afforded lands across the Roman Empire with warm, 
wet, and stable climate.  Spectacular weather conditions, aided by new technological advances 
such as watermills and metal tools, allowed agricultural productivity to skyrocket.81  Banks and 
advanced financial credit systems created new opportunities for entrepreneurship and bolstered 
the economy.  Increased travel and trade also contributed to economic growth:  commerce 
exploded during the pax Romana, marking a “golden age of trade”82 in which trade networks 
spread like spider webs, connecting far-flung corners of the empire to more centralized towns 
and cities.  
 With nearly a quarter of the world’s total population under Rome’s sway,83 the Roman 
Empire had succeeded in creating an enormous region of internal trade, travel, socialization, 
innovation, and agricultural cultivation on an unprecedented scale.  This would not have been 
possible without Rome’s military prowess.  Including legions, auxiliary units, navy, and irregular 
units, the Roman “imperial war machine” was composed of approximately 500,000 men.84  Raw 
manpower was the main ingredient for Rome’s military success.85  During the pax Romana, 
Rome had largely succeeded in the challenging task of striking a balance between increased 
territorial conquest and the preservation of peace and security within the core zone of the empire.  
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Yet this balance was fragile, and maintained by prudent leadership, shrewd military strategy, and 
to some extent, good fortune.  
 The first test to this balance had begun to develop towards the end of Antoninus Pius’ 
reign, as tensions between Rome and Parthia over Roman control of Armenia intensified.  Upon 
Pius’ death, these tensions reached a boiling point:  the Parthians made a grab for power by 
placing their own candidate on the Armenian throne.  The new Roman emperor, Marcus 
Aurelius, was tasked with squashing this threat from the east.  In 162 CE, Marcus sent his co-
emperor, Lucius Verus, to fight the Parthians.86  With the support of multiple legions and the 
expertise of several accomplished Roman generals, the Romans emerged victorious in 166 and 
triumphantly returned to Rome.  Unbeknownst to Marcus and Lucius at the time, however, was 
the fact that the remainder of their long and troubled reign would be marked by a series of futile 
attempts to ward off foreign invaders who posed a threat to the delicate balance and security of 
the Roman Empire. 
 
Outbreak of Plague 
When Lucius Verus returned to Rome after the successful Parthian Campaign, he was 
rewarded with a triumph—a traditional civil and religious ceremony of Ancient Rome, designed 
to publicly celebrate exceptional successes of Roman military commanders.  As Lucius rode 
through the streets of Rome in a chariot, accompanied by his army and their spoils of war, the 
Roman people extravagantly celebrated his defeat of the enemy in the east.  Little did they know 
at the time that a completely different enemy had already made its way past the borders of the 
empire, and was about to attack.  
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The Antonine Plague first emerged in Mesopotamia at the end of 165 or the beginning of 
166 CE.  By the end of the year it had spread to Rome.  The Roman metropolis, with its high 
population density and commerce connections across the empire, was a “pathogen bomb, 
diffusing carriers of the disease across the western Mediterranean.”87  By 168 CE, the plague had 
ravaged Rome and spread across the Roman Empire, decimating towns and peoples across the 
Roman world.  Some scholars believe that it may have traveled as far as China.88  The spread of 
disease was exacerbated by the vast trade networks that crisscrossed the empire, as well as the 
highly urbanized nature of Roman society—as many as one-fifth of the empire’s denizens are 
believed to have lived in towns,89 and this high degree of urbanization intensified the contagion 
of the plague.  In Rome and other large cities in the Empire, houses were tightly packed in the 
center of the city to encourage frequent social interaction and gatherings around public 
monuments.90  Not even those who lived in the countryside were spared, however, as many 
frequently commuted to nearby cities to conduct business and trade.  Moreover, many Romans—
both the impoverished and the wealthy—had poor diets and suffered from malnutrition, which 
made them more susceptible to falling ill.91  High population density, frequent travel, 
malnutrition, and poor sanitary conditions and waste disposal systems within cities (untreated 
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Contemporary Account of Symptoms and Modern Medical Assessment 
 Galen, a prominent physician who was living in Rome when the plague hit in 166 CE, 
recorded his observations and experience of treating those who had fallen ill in the fifth book of 
his Methodus Medendi (“On the Method of Healing”).  While Galen’s accounts are the most 
extensive description that remains from the time of the Antonine Plague, he only twice refers to 
the disease, and neither account is particularly “substantiated or substantial.”93  Galen was not 
attempting to provide a comprehensive description of the plague, or to record its symptoms for 
the benefit of future generations in the way that Thucydides had done for the Plague of Athens.  
Instead, he was more interested in recording the physical effects the disease had on its victims 
and the efficacy of different treatments. 
 According to Galen, symptoms of the Antonine Plague included a high fever, soon 
followed by the appearance of black “cutaneous lesions and pustulas”94 all over the body, which 
eventually began to dry up in instances where a patient was expected to survive.95  The infected 
soon experienced an upset stomach, black stool or diarrhea (indication of intestinal lesions), and 
in some cases, vomiting.96  Many suffered from lesions in their throats as well:  patients first 
coughed up scabs, then fresh blood, and later began to cough up part of their esophageal or 
mucous membranes.97  Others suffered from pulmonary issues, internal hemorrhaging, insomnia, 
and gangrene.98 
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No direct paleomicrobiological or archaeological evidence has been recovered from the 
time of the Antonine Plague, and as a result, DNA sequencing is not a viable option for modern 
scientists to identify the type of disease that struck Rome.99  Despite a lack of concrete physical 
evidence, scholars largely concur that the Antonine Plague is most likely to have been caused by 
smallpox.  The unique nature of the exanthem that appeared on the bodies of the infected, in 
addition to the high mortality rate of the disease, have led R. J. and M. L. Littman to conclude 
that the pestilence must have been hemorrhagic smallpox.100  In the Littmans’ widely cited 
article, they explain that the duration of the disease, combined with the other symptoms that 
Galen describes (i.e., fever, black stool, vomiting, and coughing) are all consistent with 
smallpox.101  The highly contagious nature of smallpox also makes it a likely candidate for the 
Antonine plague, as it is directly transmissible and can be contracted by the inhalation of 
airborne droplets expelled by an infected individual.  Hemorrhagic smallpox is the most lethal 
type of smallpox, and other scholars believe the particular strain responsible may have been 
poxviridae, an ancestor of smallpox.102  This theory may be useful in explaining some of the 
differences in severity between the symptoms of the Antonine Plague and those of more modern 
strains of smallpox. 
 
Archaeological Evidence and Mortality Estimates 
While more physical evidence remains from the period of the Antonine Plague than from 
certain other plagues, even then, the evidence is scant and often confusing to interpret.  As Colin 
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P. Elliott writes, “The existing epigraphic, papyrological and literary evidence is ambiguous at 
best.  It provides only a vague sense of both the chronology and causality behind a second-
century crisis which clearly featured many interconnected parts.”103  However, the lack of 
documentation from the period during which the plague is believed to have hit Rome the hardest 
actually may be a sign of the destructive impact that the plague had on Roman society.  
According to R. P. Duncan-Jones, the abrupt decline in available documentary series so closely 
with the dates of the major outbreaks of the Antonine Plague that a “connection with plague is 
likely.”104 
 The overall death toll and mortality rate of the Antonine Plague have been a hot topic of 
debate among scholars for decades.  Modern historians estimate the mortality rate of the 
pestilence to be anywhere from 1 to 33 percent, which translates to a confounding range of 1 to 
25 million deaths.105  Attempting to make such estimates is inherently challenging, as ancient 
sources are not only vague, but scholars have reason to believe that certain ancient authors may 
have exaggerated their accounts or estimates of the plague’s death toll.  According to Géza 
Alföldy, “the tradition of Roman pessimism regarding the history of one’s own time was, as we 
know, as old as Roman literature itself.”106 
 Estimating the epidemic’s death toll is also complicated by the fact that the same disease 
can have varying effects on the different regions due to factors like population density and 
individuals’ nutrition.  Take the Plague of Athens, for example:  ancient writers recount the 
ferocity with which the plague struck Athens, yet the areas surrounding the city—characterized 
by significantly lower population density—were barely affected.  Another issue is that the 
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majority of the papyrological evidence and data about population sizes that has survived from the 
Antonine period originate from Egypt.107  Nonetheless, many scholars have attempted to use 
Egyptian census data to hypothesize the impact the plague may have had in the city of Rome or 
in other parts of the empire.  Eriny Hanna warns of the dangers of conducting such a task, 
because “Egypt’s geography, culture, and division of labor were significantly different than any 
other province, let alone a city.”108  
 Nor does modern scientific knowledge of smallpox aid in a death toll analysis:  the 
Littmans write that, depending on the virulence of a given strain, the mortality rate of a smallpox 
outbreak might range anywhere from 1 to 80 percent.109  On one extreme, some scholars (e.g., 
Otto Seeck) have posited that over half of the Roman Empire’s population perished from the 
Antonine Plague.110  On the other extreme (e.g., J.F. Gilliam), some scholars believe the 
mortality rate was only one or two percent.111  However, most scholars agree that a mortality rate 
anywhere between 7 and 10 percent, or 7 to 8 million total deaths, is a more reasonable estimate 
for the total death toll of the Antonine Plague in the 23 years during which it spread across the 
empire.112  Yet, even the estimates on the lower end of the range have a sufficiently hefty death 
toll to arouse concern:  Kyle Harper writes that, even at the lowest estimates, the plague “was, in 
absolute terms, the worst disease event in human history up to that time.”113  It may be 
reasonable to assume that the mortality rates were lower in rural areas and higher (13-15%) in 
cities and armies.114 
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Impact on Military 
The plague took a disproportionate toll on Roman military forces.  As the plague 
continued to ravage Rome towards the end of 168 CE, Romans faced a threat to their northeast 
border, as the Marcomanni and Quadi had crossed the Danube and entered Italy.115  Both 
emperors, Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius, attended by Galen, hastened north with their 
armies to the winter camp at Aquileia.  There, the plague decimated the Roman army, killing 
many, including Lucius Verus in 169.  Ancient historian Jerome attested that the Roman army 
suffered a catastrophic loss of life due to the plague, and that by 172 CE, the army had been 
nearly reduced to extinction.116  The legions, citing loss of manpower, petitioned for help from 
Rome.117  Marcus Aurelius was forced to employ emergency recruiting measures to revitalize the 
Roman forces:  his biography reports that he resorted to “emergency conscriptions of slaves and 
gladiators and unusual levies of brigands.”118 
The severely depleted army placed Rome at a considerable disadvantage for the 
remainder of the Marcomannic Wars.  Marcus spent the final decade of his life in a “grinding 
and indecisive campaign” in the north.119  Upon his death in 180 CE, the Roman army still 
needed to conduct another year or two of warfare to secure the northern border.120  However, the 
new emperor Commodus, eager to return to Rome and relish in the “ease and luxury of the 
imperial court,” conceded the territory which the Romans had been fighting for and entered into 
a peace treaty with the Marcomanni.121  Roman triumph in the Parthian campaign of 166 would 
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be Rome’s sole military success for nearly fifty years.  The army’s ability to fend off intruders 
along the far-flung borders of the Roman Empire was permanently diminished in the wake of the 
Antonine Plague:  “never again was Rome to hold the upper hand in its dealings with the 
Germanic tribes beyond the now reestablished borders of the empire.”122  The challenges Rome 
faced at its borders and beyond in the post-Marcus Aurelius era are believed by some historians 
to have marked a turning point in the “fortunes of the empire.”123  Yet the loss in military might 
and manpower was only one of many detrimental effects the Antonine Plague had on Rome.  
Having swept across the empire for at least fifteen years after the initial outbreak in 165 CE, the 




From the late republic through the early empire, Rome had enjoyed a prosperous and 
remarkably stable economy:  according to Peter Temin’s data analysis, prices remained stable, 
and inflation remained below two percent each year.124  In response to the Antonine Plague, 
however, prices and wages rose sharply—nearly doubling—towards the end of the second 
century CE.125  The supply of labor decreased as many workers had died from the plague.  While 
the same amount of money remained in circulation as there had been prior to the plague, it was 
dispersed among fewer consumers, who in turn used their money to bid up the prices of goods in 
short supply.126  Agricultural production was disrupted, and a reduction in the population shifted 
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the ratio of land to labor across the countrysides of the empire.127  As labor became more scarce 
and land more abundant, labor prices and wages increased, while land prices plummeted.128  
Data from Roman Egypt indicates that land, rent, wine, and oil prices all decreased during the 
time of the epidemic, wheat prices stayed the same (this is largely attributable to the fact that 
Egypt was a major wheat exporter), while monthly wages and donkey prices increased.129 
 Production plummeted in other sectors of the economy as well.  The mining of silver 
collapsed suddenly, creating a short-term monetary crisis that resulted in the debasement of 
silver coinage from 165 CE onwards.130  Public infrastructure projects appear to have all but 
ceased for some time after the plague.  A gap in records from 166 to 173 CE suggests that there 
was little activity in Rome’s marble quarries during the Antonine Plague, and when activity later 
resumed, it occurred on a much smaller scale than before.131  The plague’s death toll reduced the 
number of taxpayers, businessmen, and farmers throughout the Roman Empire.  This quickly 
became problematic, as expenses for maintaining the empire and paying military forces 
continued to rise as individual earnings and government revenue declined. 
 It is clear that the Roman Empire was in dire need of money:  the high costs of waging 
war and employing soldiers to fight the Macromanni took a toll on imperial finances during 
Marcus Aurelius’ reign, as he was forced to auction off treasures from the imperial palace to 
raise military funds.132  However, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Empire continued 
to struggle financially for decades after Marcus’ death.  In the first and second centuries CE, 
Roman rulers had taken a relatively laissez-faire approach to their management of Roman 
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territories.  The empire was “highly decentralized,” with local governors and advisors ruling 
their respective provinces, while local elites handled tax collection.133  After the Antonine 
Plague, however, the Roman taxation system became increasingly centralized:  central 
government officials, tasked with the collection of taxes and supplies for the state, were 
dispatched to various cities and countrysides across the empire.134  According to Arjan 
Zuiderhoek, ancient sources “point towards a clear central government attempt to gain greater 
direct control over provincial surplus extraction by means of centralizing the gathering of taxes,” 
and such a response is “expected” of an imperial government grappling with declining tax 
revenue spurred by demographic contraction.135  The Antonine Plague appears to have had a 
destructive impact on the Roman economy and the Empire’s financial situation. 
 Nowhere in the Roman Empire were the tremors of economic decline felt more than in 
Roman Egypt.  Egypt featured the highest population density of any province in the empire—
nearly 300 people per square kilometer,136 which created conditions ripe for the spread of 
disease.  Thus, while population decline from the plague had already taken a toll on local 
economies, the imperial taxes imposed upon Egyptian villages exacerbated the financial 
struggles that many faced.  The collection of Egyptian poll taxes—flat-rate taxes paid by all adult 
male residents—was delegated to the municipal level, and local communities were expected to 
collect payment from their residents.137  The value of the taxes each town was expected to gather 
were calculated using census data that was collected every fourteen years.138  Understandably, 
the plague’s death toll must have created a serious burden on local towns to collect taxes, the 
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amount of which had been calculated based on their pre-plague population.139  Census figures in 
tax documents indicate that villages along the Nile delta suffered dramatic population loss, which 
is likely attributable to some combination of individuals having died from the plague and 
individuals having fled to other areas.  Between A.D. 159/60 and 169/70, some towns in the Nile 
delta showed a 70-90% decline in adult male registered taxpayers.140  This astonishing decrease 
in population is likely due to some combination of plague deaths and the decision of many to flee 
so that they could avoid paying hefty taxes.  
Economic struggles that initially had been caused by the plague’s death toll soon 
precipitated an agricultural crisis, which further worsened the economic situation in Roman 
Egypt.  Farm leases in Egypt during and after the Antonine Plague “show strong 
abnormalities.”141  Many individuals began to rent significantly smaller plots of land in the 
decades following the plague, and agricultural production levels appear to have been remarkably 
far off from their projections.  P.Oxy.LXVI 4527, a list of taxes “from the meris of Herakleides 
in the Arsinoite nome” dating from 185 CE, indicates that the percentage of wheat harvested at 
the end of the year was only 27.5% of the projected figure.142  According to Elliott, Roman 
Egypt’s “volatile mixture of a short-term agricultural crisis, tax burdens, and economic 
inequality” may also explain the surge in civil unrest in the years during and after the outbreak of 
plague in Egypt.143  
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Social Changes 
While Egypt faced social unrest and revolts in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague and 
in response to the tanking economy, whether or not comparable social unrest occurred in other 
areas of the Roman Empire is a subject of debate among scholars.  Danielle Gourevitch broadly 
asserts that the Roman population was panic-stricken and “behaved strangely, coming to unusual 
religious and magical attitudes, unheard of cowardly acts, and dangerous disturbances.”144  On 
the other hand, Kyle Harper argues that “None of the literary sources for the Antonine Plague 
report social chaos in the midst of the pestilence; the integrity of the social order seems to have 
held together, except perhaps for a complex crisis in the Nile delta.”145  Without a doubt, the 
plague disrupted Roman citizens’ way of life.  However, whether or not such unrest occurred on 
a scale similar to the Nile delta is unclear. 
 Although a semblance of social order may have been preserved in many areas of the 
Roman Empire—the Nile Delta notwithstanding—the Antonine Plague era was marked by 
considerable social change.  Even prior to the Antonine Plague, Roman society had been 
remarkably accepting and provided opportunities for social mobility:  citizenship rights were 
liberally bestowed, and men from provinces were able to gain entry into the upper classes of the 
Roman aristocracy.146  While wealth was unequally distributed and Rome was home to an 
extensive slavery system, Roman society was still markedly more progressive than many other 
ancient societies.  The plague did not level social equality—even after the plague, Rome’s 
political and landlord classes were able to exert control over the empire’s agricultural territories 
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and rural populations.147  However, it did create new opportunities for commoners to hold 
political office.  For example, the heavy mortality of the Antonine Plague in Athens claimed the 
lives of so many individuals who had previously been eligible to hold office that Marcus 
Aurelius was forced to loosen the requirements for eligibility in the 170s.  In 174/75, Marcus 
Aurelius wrote to Athens to loosen the rules for office-holding, scrapping the previous 
requirement that any individual who wished to hold office needed to have three generations of 
citizen ancestry.148  According to Duncan-Jones, Marcus’ sudden abandonment of these rules 
indicates a “serious crisis.”149 
 
Religious Changes 
 The Antonine Plague ushered in an era of religious change across the empire as well.  In 
the absence of germ theory, many turned to religion for an explanation of the origins of the 
plague.  One theory was that, while the Romans were sacking Seleucia after having defeated the 
Parthians, Lucius Verus opened a sealed tomb that released the virus.150  According to this 
theory, the plague was a punishment from the gods, as the Romans had violated an earlier oath 
not to pillage the city.  The other preeminent explanation was that a Roman soldier had opened a 
casket in the Temple of Apollo in Babylon, which allowed the plague to escape.151  Both theories 
persisted for centuries after the plague’s outbreak:  two different fourth-century sources “ascribe 
the outbreak to participating in a sacrilege, violating the sanctuary of a god and breaking the 
oath.”152  As many Romans believed these theories to be legitimate explanations for the onset of 
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the pestilence, the immediate response was a widespread worship of Apollo, in the hopes that the 
god might be appeased into warding off the plague.153  Eleven apotropaic inscriptions have been 
found on stones recovered from various corners of the empire, which, embedded into stone walls 
to ward off the plague, prayed “To the gods and goddesses, according to the interpretation of 
Apollo at Claros.”154  According to Kyle Harper, the proliferation of Apolline religion generated 
by the Antonine plague was “utterly unlike anything else in the records of ancient epigraphy.”155 
 However, polytheistic worship of the Greco-Roman gods—the prevalent form of religion 
for the previous several centuries—was no longer the only religion in town.  Christianity had 
made its way to Rome and was on the rise.  While the influence of the church spread rapidly 
across the empire in the second century, Christians’ position within Roman society was far from 
desirable, as they were often made as scapegoats for local crises and subjected to abuse or 
punishment.156  Things worsened during the plague, as Marcus Aurelius launched persecutions 
against Christians who refused to pay homage to the Greco-Roman gods, whom Marcus believed 
had made their wrath known in the form of the epidemic.157  Despite the violence that they faced 
from the Roman authorities, Christians proved invaluable to Roman society in the late second 
century.  Christians believed they were obligated to help others in times of sickness or need, and 
while the Antonine Plague ravaged Rome, many brought food and water to the sick and helped 
care for them.158  While the violence Christians faced at the hands of the Roman imperial 
government during the plague is disconcerting, some scholars believe that Christianity ultimately 
gained traction in the aftermath of the plague, as the promise of salvation in the afterlife attracted 
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additional followers.159  Thus, the pestilence was marked by an upheaval of the pre-existing 
religious order, which often came at the cost of Christian livelihood, in spite of the help the 
Christians had provided to the sick.  
 
Political Changes 
 Another consequence of the plague was that it cut short Marcus Aurelius’ life.  Although 
Marcus Aurelius’ reign was consumed by his military standoff in the north, his personal 
reputation has “never failed of admirers,”160 and he attempted to do his best to lead the Roman 
people through troublesome times.  He devoted the majority of his time and resources to 
defending the borders of the Roman Empire and is often regarded as a man of ability with a 
strong sense of duty to Rome.  Put simply, Marcus “sacrificed his own delights and interests to 
the well-being of the state.”161  Unfortunately, the same cannot not be said of his successors.  
 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus would be the last of the “Five Good Emperors,”162 as his son 
and successor Commodus did not embody similar leadership qualities.  Commodus was a 
narcissistic emperor whose rule was marred by political strife and outrageous behavior.  
Commodus claimed that he was related to Hercules and dressed accordingly, often donning lion 
skins and carrying a club.163  He declared himself the “new Romulus” in 190 CE, and just two 
years later, gave himself the official title of “Hercules.”164  Commodus later attempted to rename 
every month of the calendar to correspond to the various absurd titles he had bestowed upon 
himself.165  With growing vigor, the emperor Commodus presented himself “as the center of 
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Roman life.”166  While Commodus frequently proclaimed that his era of leadership should be 
regarded as a “Golden Age,” in the view of Dio Cassius—a third century historian—Commodus’ 
accession as emperor marked the descent of the Roman Empire “from a kingdom of gold to one 
of rust and iron.”167 
 While the Antonine Plague did not cause an immediate leadership struggle, it clipped 
“the miraculous efflorescence of the pax Romana” at its bloom.168  The years following 
Commodus’ reign were distinguished by a frequent turnover of emperors.  According to Temin, 
the number of emperors in each half-century remained in the single digits until the late second 
century, “after which it stayed in double digits until 500 CE.”169 
 
Conclusion 
 In many ways, it is unfortunate that the very things that made the Roman Empire great in 
the first and second centuries—trade, travel, frequent exchange of ideas, control over large 
swaths of territory, and military might—were what exacerbated the spread and destruction 
caused by the Antonine Plague.  While social issues and inequalities existed in the empire prior 
to the outbreak of plague, many problems were either created or amplified by the pestilence.  The 
outbreak of the Antonine Plague has been cited by some historians as a turning point in the 
history of the Roman Empire; a calamity that sent Rome hurtling towards collapse.  The ancient 
historian Herodian wrote that the period of Roman history after the death of Marcus Aurelius 
was “a continual series of heavy catastrophes, interrupted at best by short breathing-spells which 
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were followed, however, by worse periods, with the danger that the Empire might collapse.”170  
The Cunhas write that the Antonine Plague “was a blow from which Rome never recovered,”171 
and that it “most definitely set Rome on her long decline to ruin.”172  Christer Bruun urges 
readers to take caution in accepting such a narrative, remarking that readers should not take late 
literary sources “at face value when they claim [the Antonine Plague] was the worst ever.”173 
 While the Roman Empire certainly needed time to recover from the effects of the 
Antonine Plague, many scholars believe that Rome was able to recuperate in the decades that 
followed.  Although Rome never returned to the height of its pre-plague population, Harper 
reminds us that the empire was so heavily populated prior to the plague that even a considerable 
death toll would have left Rome by no means empty.174  Claims other authors have made, like 
“so many people died that the economy came close to failing,”175 are not credible in the context 
of an estimated 7-10% mortality rate.  Moreover, in the years after the plague, birth rates 
skyrocketed, and the population once again began to increase at a steady rate.176  
Walter Scheidel urges caution in drawing sweeping conclusions regarding the 
permanency of Roman decline after the Antonine Plague.  Given the minimal evidence that 
remains from the time, he urges that “historians would be well advised to exercise restraint in 
instrumentalizing this poorly known event as a ‘deus ex machina’ mechanism to account for 
presumed demographic or economic transformations.”177  Thus, while the Antonine Plague “was 
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not a decisive event in Roman history,”178  A. E. R. Boak and other scholars suggest that the 
Antonine Plague, along with other outbreaks, may represent a useful starting point for 
understanding the beginning of the decline of the Roman Empire.  It is undeniable that the 
plague marked the end of the era of the pax Romana, created economic hardships for many, and 
altered Roman politics, social dynamics, and religion.  And while it cannot be said that the 
Antonine Plague is to blame for the fall of the Roman Empire in the centuries that followed, the 
upheaval of the status-quo that it provoked ended “a certain trajectory in the development of 
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THE PLAGUE OF CYPRIAN (250 CE) 
 
Background 
In the century following the Antonine Plague, the Roman Empire slowly began to revive. 
While the empire’s population levels would never again reach pre-Antonine Plague levels, 
Rome’s population rebounded spectacularly.  Under the prudent leadership of rulers from the 
Severan Dynasty, the empire’s “most influential dynastic builders,”180 between the years of 193 
and 235 CE Rome’s demography and economy recovered and flourished.  Prices, which had 
risen sharply in response to the plague, eventually stabilized, and the minted coinage of the 
Roman state—despite having been debased—managed to regain full purchasing power.181  
Citizenship rights were bestowed liberally from 212 onwards after Caracalla granted citizenship 
to all free inhabitants of the Empire.182  A building boom serves as further evidence of the 
recovery.  The Severan emperors undertook ambitious construction projects, such as the famous 
triumphal arch in the Roman Forum and the Baths of Caracalla.  Peace had been re-established 
and the empire re-stabilized.  
 Although Alexander Severus—the last of the Severans—was assassinated while 
campaigning along the Rhine in 235, his successors continued to conduct military campaigns and 
successfully secured the borders of the empire.  After years of war with Persia, Philip the Arab, 
who served as Rome’s emperor from 244 to 249, finally negotiated a peace treaty with the 
Persian king Shapur I.183  Philip’s background, as well as his provincial and administrative 
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policies, were similar to those of the Severans.  He attempted administrative reforms in Egypt 
and commissioned the improvement of roads across the empire.184  In April of 248 CE, under 
Philip the Arab’s reign, the Romans celebrated the 1000th anniversary of their city’s foundation. 
This spectacular festival lasted for “three days and three nights,”185 as Romans took to the streets 
to party and celebrate.  There was much to extol:  over the course of a millennium, Rome—once 
a small village of outcasts and dreamers—now spanned three continents and had morphed into 
one of the world’s most powerful empires.  
 Just one year later, Philip the Arab was murdered.  He had sent one of his new 
commanders, Gaius Messius Quintus Decius, north to assemble the Danubian troops, yet the 
troops revolted and proclaimed Decius as their emperor.186  Decius’ troops subsequently 
assassinated Philip.  The abrupt end to Philip’s reign “touched off a spiral of dissolution that 
would engulf the entire imperial order.”187  Decius, desperate to endear himself to the Roman 
aristocracy and legitimize his rule, undertook “a highly conservative program of imperial 
propaganda.”188  While his infrastructure projects were commendable, as he restored the Roman 
Colosseum and commissioned the Decian baths, the wide-scale attacks he launched on Christians 
were horrifying.  Decius attacked the growing Christian minority within the empire, launching 
empire-wide persecutions and promoting violence against them.189  In 251 CE, Decius was 
murdered in battle at Abrittus, and Trebonianus Gallus was named as his successor.  
 Eager to head west and return to Rome to solidify his position as emperor, Gallus signed 
a peace treaty with the Goths, whom he and Decius had been fighting in the east.190  The most 
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formidable threat to the empire of which the Romans were aware had, for the time being, been 
quelled.  But, unbeknownst to the Romans at the time, another menacing enemy in the east had 
already begun to move westward and was rapidly approaching the boundaries of the Roman 
Empire.   
 
Timeline and Contemporary Account of Symptoms  
The Cyprian Plague hit major urban areas, towns, and countrysides alike, regardless of 
population density.  It was indiscriminate across social lines, highly contagious (in the words of 
one 10th-century source, it was “transmitted through the clothing or simply by sight”191), and 
attacked its victims mercilessly, displaying an exceptionally high mortality rate.  It struck most 
ferociously in the late fall and winter, and its effects were exacerbated by the drought and famine 
that occurred throughout the Roman empire prior to the plague’s arrival and throughout the 
multi-decade duration of the plague’s attack.192  The disease continued to resurface for two 
decades after its original appearance; its presence has been attested by various circum-
Mediterranean populations from 248 until 270.193 
According to a letter from Dionysius of Alexandria, the Cyprian Plague first emerged in 
Alexandria in 249.  Moving from east to west, the disease quickly spread across the Roman 
Empire, reaching Rome in the late summer or early fall of 251 CE, and arriving at Carthage in 
the summer of 252.  The plague featured an acute onset, debilitating diarrhea, an “attack of 
fevers,” vomiting, excessive thirst, and conjunctival bleeding.194  In many cases, patients’ limbs 
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had putrefied and needed to be amputated.195  According to Cyprian’s “De mortalitate”—the sole 
surviving contemporary account of the disease’s symptoms—those who managed to survive 
faced severe debilitation, brain damage, hearing loss, and blindness.196  While the Romans were 
well acquainted with periodic cycles of epidemic mortality, the Plague of Cyprian “was 
something qualitatively new”:197  a virgin soil epidemic to which no individual was immune.  
The Cyprian Plague is surprisingly well attested, especially in light of third century Rome’s 
notoriously obscure literary evidence.  Kyle Harper has identified twenty-three distinct literary 
witnesses to the plague, seven of whom were contemporary with the plague, hailing from across 
the empire—from Egypt and North Africa to Syria and Athens.198  
 
Modern Medical Assessment 
To date, it has not been possible to ascertain the specific pathogen responsible for the 
Plague of Cyprian through an examination of genetic evidence recovered from archaeological 
remains.  However, through careful analysis of available literary evidence from the time, 
historians and scientists have been able to make a convincing disease assessment.  In past 
decades, historians have posited a wide range of possible diseases:  measles (W. H. McNeil), 
meningitis (H. Zinsser), smallpox, influenza, or bubonic plague.199  However, the symptoms and 
seasonality of the plague—as described by ancient sources—make influenza, bubonic plague, 
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its communicability and fatality rates align with the plague, along with a number of its other 
symptoms, yet it can only be a “possible culprit,” as smallpox typically occurs in the summer, 
and Cyprian does not mention the rash characteristic of smallpox.201 
In the past two decades, scholars have come to agree that viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF), 
a family of zoonotic diseases caused by a variety of RNA viruses, appears to be the most likely 
disease responsible for the Cyprian Plague.202  There are various strains of VHF that can be 
transmitted in different ways.  However, scientists believe that the strains carried by rodents and 
insects are unlikely to have caused the Cyprian Plague, as there is no literary evidence to suggest 
that rodents were prevalent at the time, and the seasonality of the plague does not make insects 
(typically mosquitoes in the case of VHF) a likely carrier.203  Thus, the most likely type of VHF 
to be responsible for the plague of Cyprian is a filovirus:  a hemorrhagic fever such as Ebola, 
which is highly contagious and transmitted from one person to another via bodily fluids.204  Such 
a virus can survive for days inside of dead bodies, making burial dangerous and a source of 
spread for the infection.205  The symptoms of Ebola align exactly with those that Cyprian 
describes.  Moreover, the style of contagion would make sense in light of our knowledge 
regarding the timeline of the Cyprian Plague.  A filovirus would be able to diffuse quickly across 
the empire, but because of its reliance on bodily fluids for transmission and its failure to confer 
immunity upon its victims, “it could exhibit the slow burning, ‘unusually relentless’ dynamics 
that so struck contemporary observers.”206  While Ebola virus may be used as a model for the 
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Cyprian plague, it is possible that the plague was another strain of filovirus with which we are 
unfamiliar in the modern era.207  This is because DNA from VHF diseases historically have not 




 Poor record-keeping from the third century has made it impossible to estimate the death 
toll of the Cyprian Plague.  One of Dionysius of Alexandria’s letters—addressed to the bishop 
Hierax in 249—implies a 62% drop in the population of Alexandria during the time of the 
Cyprian plague.209  However, as in the case of population decline during the Antonine Plague, it 
is reasonable to assume that this drop is attributable to some combination of plague mortalities 
and individuals fleeing from the region.  In 262, it is written in the Historia Augusta that “Such a 
great plague arose in both Rome and the cities of Greece that in one day 5000 people died of the 
same disease.”210  While ancient authors are notorious for hyperbole, it is clear that the mortality 
of the Cyprian Plague was exceptionally severe and struck on an unprecedented scale.  The 
Ebola crisis of 2013-2016 had a mortality rate somewhere between a 40 and 70%, and it would 
be reasonable to estimate a similar mortality rate for those who were infected in Rome in the 
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third century.211  Ancient sources affirm a grim death toll, describing the plague as a disease that 
“day by day” abruptly “attack[ed] numberless people, every one from his own house.”212 
 There also exists strong archaeological evidence in support of an empire-wide plague in 
the 250s CE.  Archaeologists have discovered a mass grave in Thebes with a “purpose-built 
corpse incineration complex.”213  Dating from the mid-third century, the burial methods for the 
dead in this complex indicate haste and unorganized deposition.214  Therefore, it can reasonably 
be assumed that those buried in this mass grave were victims of the Cyprian Plague.215  In 2002, 
archaeologists recovered mass burials at the Catacombs of Marcellinus and Peter, unearthing 
large rooms stacked with more than 1300 skeletons buried in a single event, the timing of which 
also coincides with that of the Plague of Cyprian.216  According to Michael McCormick, these 
specific findings, as well as others across the empire, may be considered as evidence of the 
plague, as they are characterized by the “burial of a large number of human beings that violates 
the traditional norms by which [Roman] society enmeshed and interpreted death.”217 
 This empire-wide pandemic wrought havoc across the three separate continents which the 
Roman Empire straddled at the time, and spanned the reign of at least eight Roman emperors. 
Such an enormous death toll and upheaval of daily life came with extreme religious, economic, 
military, and sociopolitical changes. 
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Religious Changes 
Near the end of 249 CE, Decius required all Roman citizens to partake in pagan religious 
sacrifices, and “deployed the machinery of the empire to enforce [his] order.”218  Not only were 
Christians frequently scapegoated, but Decius forced them to prove their loyalty to Rome with an 
act of pagan sacrifice.  When many Christians refused to comply, the Roman government 
extended its efforts to squash the growing church, exerting control over and inflicting 
punishments upon those who refused to comply.  
The majority pagan population, alongside pagan emperors, quickly blamed the outbreak 
of the Cyprian Plague on the perceived failure of the Christian community to adequately worship 
the pagan gods.219  As the pagans believed that Apollo had the power to protect them from 
plague and famine, their worship of Apollo intensified in a similar manner as it had during the 
Antonine Plague.  This is evidenced by the large number of coins that were minted in the empire 
from 251 to 260 CE inscribed with “Apollo Salutaris” (Apollo the healer).220  Despite the 
charitable work of many Christians during the epidemic—they cared for the sick and even helped 
the pagans when they fell ill—in 252 CE, Gallus, too, ordered sacrifices to be made across the 
Empire. As Christian communities across the Roman Empire had already been “embattled before 
the plague’s arrival,”221 Gallus’ order, paired with the high mortality and suffering caused by the 
plague, heightened the terror that many felt.  
One of the most comprehensive and frequently cited sources contemporary with the 
plague is Cyprian’s “De mortalitate,” a sermon addressed to the Christian community during the 
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plague’s outbreak at Carthage in 252 CE.  Cyprian himself was a pagan who had converted to 
Christianity and served as the Bishop of Carthage from 248 to 258.222  In his sermon, Cyprian 
attempted to address the Christians’ fears surrounding the increasingly hostile treatment they 
faced from the Roman government, as well as the high mortality rate of the epidemic as it 
ravaged the city.  As the extreme virulence of the virus made it unreasonable for him to foster 
hope of physical healing, Cyprian instead attempted to persuade the Christians of the spiritual 
gains that would result from their suffering from the plague, developing a “biblical framework” 
through which the trials the Christians faced could be viewed as “spiritually beneficial.”223   
At the time, Cyprian viewed the plague as an apocalyptic event that presaged the “end of 
the territorial world and the coming to the kingdom of heaven.”224  Under the circumstances that 
the third century Romans faced, it is understandable that they viewed the epidemic as 
apocalyptic, because their lack of knowledge regarding the cause of the disease “led to a feeling 
of complete helplessness and contributed greatly to the terror experienced during the 
epidemic.”225  Cyprian reassured the Christians that the suffering they faced from the plague 
would help to confirm their faith in God and secure their place in heaven, proclaiming that “all 
the injury inflicted by present troubles is to be despised in the assurance of future blessing.”226  
Moreover, he encouraged the Christians to “rejoice” in their ability to “stand erect amid the 
desolation of the human race, and not to lie prostrate with those who have no hope in God.”227  
While many Christians were troubled by the fact that the plague did not discriminate between 
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them and the pagans, Cyprian attempted to dispel their anxieties and promote hope and 
excitement for their ultimate arrival in heaven. 
In 260 CE, Gallienus stopped the persecution of Christians, marking the beginning of an 
era of peace upon the church that lasted for more than forty years.  While the raw facts 
concerning the rise of Christianity in the wake of the Cyprian plague are “obscure and heavily 
debated,”228 it is evident that Christians began to move “confidently” and “in high circles,” 
becoming “more visible than ever.”229  Until 200 CE, Christians had been “virtually invisible in 
the documentary record,”230 but by 300 CE it was clear that Christianity had become more 
widespread, as evidenced by the increased use of Christian names in papyri, and the construction 
of Christian meeting spaces and burial sites in Rome.231  According to one estimate, by 300 CE, 
up to 15-20% of the Egyptian population may have been Christian.232  While paganism remained 
the most popular form of religion, in the wake of the Cyprian Plague, Christianity morphed from 
being a marginal religion to a “minority” religion.233  
Although the decade during which Cyprian was the Bishop of Carthage was marked by 
“persecution, schism, and plague,”234 his leadership of the Christian community made a 
significant contribution to the subsequent rise of Christianity.  Cyprian was executed in 258 CE 
for his failure to renounce Christianity and was awarded sainthood posthumously for his 
martyrdom.  Some scholars, such as Harper, have gone so far to assert that the ten years of 
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Cyprian’s episcopate were “among the most consequential in the history of the church.”235  The 
fact that the plague came to bear Cyprian’s name in its aftermath, and that this title has endured, 
speaks to the great influence he wielded and all that he did for the church:  Caroline Wazer 
suggests that the adoption of the term “Cyprian Plague” to refer to the epidemic be viewed as 
“hard proof of the superiority of Christianity over traditional Roman religion.”236  
 
Economic Impact 
 In addition to the social turmoil and unstable political climate brought about by the 
Cyprian Plague, it also caused the Roman economy to fluctuate wildly in the 250s and 260s CE.  
Infrastructure projects stopped almost in their entirety, particularly in northern Syria around 
250/1.237  Cyprian noted the problems caused by food shortages, the exhaustion of mines and 
quarries, and the decline of craftsmanship and agriculture across the empire.238  De-urbanization, 
rural population decline, and ruptures in production and trading systems have been proven 
archaeologically as well.239  Tax records show a significant population decline in Egyptian 
settlements,240 which is likely due to a combination of deaths from the plague and the decision of 
others to relocate.  This sequence of shocks to the monetary system around 250 caused the 
Roman Empire’s silver-based monetary and financial system to disintegrate.  The silver content 
of coinage “virtually disappeared”241 as existing coins were melted and re-minted with a lower 
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silver content, and the empire stopped minting denarius and sestertius coins.242  The quantity of 
minted coins exploded, as did incidences of coin hoarding.  
 Inflation spiraled, and periods of hyperinflation occurred throughout the empire for 
nearly ninety years after the outbreak of the Cyprian Plague.243  The sophisticated credit markets 
and banking systems of the Roman world were wiped out, disappearing for more than a 
generation.  Emperors’ attempts to salvage the economy through currency reforms were to no 
avail.  Aurelian, in particular, attempted to improve Rome’s economy through monetary reform 
in 274 by introducing antoniniani coins that contained five percent silver, a higher quantity of 
silver than the coins being minted at the time.244  Not only was his reform unsuccessful—Harper 
referred to it as “the final trigger for a precipitous collapse”—but it also conveys the severity of 
the economic problems Aurelian faced, as twenty antoniniani contained the same amount of 
silver as an old silver denarius.245  Rome’s “thousand-year epoch of silver money” came to a 
crashing halt, and was eventually replaced by a gold system.246  
The dissolution of the Roman currency regime caused the private Roman economy’s 
infrastructure to crumble further.  “An accelerating spiral of disorder engulfed the empire.”247 
While the Roman economy had managed to restabilize and largely recover from the shocks it 
experienced in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague, it had attained a precarious balance.  The 
exogenous jolt of the Cyprian Plague to an already stressed economy prompted the “unparalleled 
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demise of a currency system”248 that had previously managed to survive debasement, social 
unrest, and dynastic strife. 
 
Impact on Military 
 The vast frontiers of the Roman Empire had faced threats from every direction in the 
century following the Antonine Plague.  Until the Cyprian Plague, however, Roman emperors 
had—for the most part—been successful in their campaigns to protect the borders of the empire 
from invading troops.  The preservation of the integrity and size of the Roman Empire was 
heavily dependent upon the state’s ability to maintain its defensive forces along its external 
frontiers—the Rhine-Danube frontier and the Syrian-Anatolian frontier being of particular 
concern.249  With Rome’s military forces debilitated by the Cyprian Plague, however, in the 250s 
CE the state came to face enemies on nearly every frontier and eventually lost hegemony along a 
number of fronts. 
 Threats to the Roman Empire had already begun to escalate along the Danube during the 
reign of Philip the Arab.  However, he managed to repel the attacks of various tribes along the 
Lower Danube.250  Under Decius, the situation at the border exploded, and “the empire was faced 
with cascading violence that it could not contain.”251  In 250, the Carpi and Goths crossed the 
Danube and attacked.  Decius was murdered a year later in battle against the Goths at Abrittus.252  
It was around this time that the plague had begun to ravage the empire, and the losses suffered by 
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the Roman military from the plague, as well as the political instability throughout the empire, 
made Rome ripe for attack in the eyes of its enemies.  
 In the east, Persian king Shapur I advanced to the Euphrates in 252 CE, his attack directly 
motivated by his knowledge that the Roman army had been depleted by the pestilence.253  Shapur 
annexed Armenia, invaded Syria, and captured the city of Antioch.  Gallus, preoccupied by his 
dealings with the plague in Rome, failed “to take any serious action at all”—he did not even 
attempt to bolster Rome’s defenses in the east to stop Shapur.254  One Roman frontier buckled 
after another.  In the years 250-252, the Danubian front collapsed, and the Romans lost control of 
the entire Danube line.255  And in 252, after Shapur’s attack and plunder of interior Asia Minor, 
the Euphrates front fell too.256  The Goths rampaged from the Black Sea to the Aegean.  In the 
mid-250s, the Rhine frontier system disintegrated.257  As Rome’s defensive network gradually 
imploded, “the smell of blood seemed to draw attacks like never before.”258 
When Valerian and his son Gallienus became co-emperors in 253 CE, they divided their 
efforts geographically in an attempt to quell the threats they faced along the borders:  Valerian 
was responsible for commanding Roman troops in the east, while Gallienus handled the west.259 
Gallienus valiantly fought against the Germanic tribes along the Gaul and Rhine frontier, and 
successfully secured the stability of the region through his negotiation of an alliance with the 
Marcomannic king.260  In the east, Valerian rescued Antioch from Persian control, but he was 
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quickly taken captive by Shapur, leaving Gallienus as the sole ruler of the Roman Empire.261  For 
the remainder of his reign, Gallienus faced a number of challenges to his authority—not only 
from the recurring invasions and revolts from Rome’s enemies, but also by a number of the 
military commanders he had appointed, who used their authority “to create another threat.”262  
Gallienus was assassinated in 268 in a coup orchestrated by Claudius II. 
 Although he had not come to power in an ethical manner, during his two-year rule, 
Claudius II managed to re-secure certain territories of the Roman Empire.  He defeated the 
Alemanni after they had invaded Italy, and stopped a massive Goth invasion (of >250,000 men), 
winning the Gothic War for the time being.263  Claudius II’s reign was cut short by his death 
from the Cyprian Plague in 270 when it demolished his troops at Sirmium.264 
 It is ironic that the very dispersal of Roman soldiers across the empire in the mid-250th 
century to protect Rome’s borders, and their frequent movements throughout the empire, was a 
factor that not only aided the spread of the Cyprian Plague across the Roman Empire, but also 
exacerbated the effects of the Cyprian Plague as it weakened Rome and its military forces.  The 
instability of the West between 251 and 269 occurred on a level which Rome had never before 
seen.  Unfortified towns and villages along the borders of the empire, whose territory had 
previously been taken for granted, were “razed by a profusion of invaders from the Lower Rhine 
to the Black Sea.”265  Aurelian, who ruled as emperor from 270 to 275, erected sturdy walls (13 
feet thick, and 24 feet high266) around Rome—a city previously regarded as impenetrable—to 




263 Weigel, “Claudius II Gothicus (268-270).” 
264 Ibid. 
265 Harper, “Pandemics and Passages to Late Antiquity: Rethinking the Plague of c.249–270 Described by Cyprian,” 
256. 
266 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Aurelian Wall.” 
61 
a trigger for the invasions Rome faced along many corners of the empire, as well as a reason for 
Rome’s struggle to contain the threat.267  According to Herodian, wars against the barbarians 
were “no longer struggles to secure the frontiers but to save the very existence of the Empire.”268  
The dangers the empire faced in the wake of the Cyprian Plague came from all directions—Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Mesopotamia, and Syria—and posed serious threats to the stability of the empire, 
generating permanent changes in Rome’s military strategy and warfare.	
	
Social and Political Changes 
 In the fifty years following Philip the Arab’s assassination, Rome was ruled by more than 
twenty emperors.269  The political climate of the empire was remarkably unstable:  many third-
century authors were astonished by the “quick change of emperors, raised to power by violence 
and killed shortly afterwards.”270  Roman politics came to be defined by high turnover rates, as 
leaders typically either died from plague or assassination by their political opponents. Alföldy 
laments that “Justice, fairness, and security were, on the whole, lost.”271  Ancient Romans such 
as Cassius Dio and Herodian lamented the rise of a new type of emperor in Rome, who ruled in 
an increasingly authoritarian and militaristic manner, and how “rulers became ‘bad’ or even 
worse” from the traditional viewpoint.272  Claudius II’s rule from 268-270 CE marked the 
beginning of an era often referred to as the “age of the barracks emperors.”  This age was marked 
by power struggles, as each emperor came into power because of their military prowess and 
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popularity with their troops, only to be “discarded or assassinated when favor was ultimately 
lost.”273 
 The relations of the Roman military, state, and society experienced systemic re-
organization in the years following the Cyprian Plague.  The army became, arguably, the most 
important factor in politics.  Social mobility increased, and men of lower social backgrounds 
became eligible for senatorial posts.274  Alfoldy goes so far to assert that Rome’s “old social 
order was believed to be largely lost.”275  The moneyed aristocracy who had previously 
controlled the Roman Senate lost a considerable amount of their political power.  During his 
reign, Gallienus repealed the high position of legionary commander (legatus legionis) and 
prohibited senators from pursuing military careers.276  Professional soldiers replaced senators in 
their coveted positions of high military commands, breaking with an ancient sociopolitical 
tradition that had remained intact since the late Roman Republic.  Emperors and wealthy military 
commanders paid their troops handsomely in gold to assure loyalty to their commander over the 
Roman state.  The majority of soldiers who replaced the “moneyed Mediterranean aristocracy”277 
hailed from the Danube—a small northern corner of the Roman Empire. 
 While Gallienus may not have foreseen the full implications of his decision, the 
consequences of his reform were explosive, as they worked towards the ultimate militarization 
and professionalization of the Roman state bureaucracy.278  Rome became decreasingly 
centralized after Philip the Arab’s reign.  Although the city of Rome remained respected as the 
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“symbolic center” of the Roman Empire,279 the powerful Danubian military officers and 
emperors who came into power spent most of their time outside of the city, establishing palaces 
and garrison towns along the frontiers where they were fighting.  
 
The Role of Climate 
 Based on modern scientific research, it has recently been suggested that the changing 
climate the Romans experienced in the mid-third century both exacerbated the spread of the 
Cyprian Plague and created its own host of social and political issues throughout the empire.  
Beginning in the mid-second century, the warm and fertile climate conditions of the Roman 
Climate Optimum (RCO) slowly came to an end, bringing about a period known as the Late 
Roman Transition (LRT).280  The weather throughout the Roman empire became cooler, drier, 
and more variable.281  Aridity intensified, and less rainfall resulted in droughts and infrequent 
flooding of the Nile delta.282 
Droughts and poor floods parched North Africa from 244 to 248, which quickly proved 
to be problematic.  Egypt had always been “miraculously fertile” and the “breadbasket of 
Rome.”283  Romans had come to depend on levels of agricultural production that relied upon the 
unusually good weather conditions during the RCO.  And, at a time when the empire needed it 
the most, the Nile “abandoned them spectacularly.”284  Pinched for grain, the state had no choice 
but to purchase grain from private stores at a high cost.  In 248, the Bishop of Alexandria wrote 
that the Nile riverbed was “as parched as the desert.”285  The agricultural crisis, drought, and 
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famine that the LRT spurred in Egypt caused people to migrate across the empire.  In the words 
of Harper, these issues amounted “to the severest environmental crisis detectable at any point in 
the seven centuries of Roman Egypt.”286  It is possible that the changing global climate may even 
have triggered ecological changes that caused the Plague of Cyprian to erupt in the first place.287 
 
Conclusion 
While the Plague of Cyprian certainly contributed to what is often referred to as the 
“third-century crisis” of the Roman Empire, it is difficult to argue that the plague was the sole 
catalyst of the crisis.  According to Harper, the profound political and military changes that 
occurred in the third century do “not necessarily require a major health crisis to explain why it 
happened.”288  While the plague’s correlation with profound societal change should be noted, 
given the lack of evidence that has survived from this time period, only so much can be said 
about “the possibility of causal links.”289  As Harper writes, the collapse of Rome’s frontiers, 
dynasties, and economy “was as much the consequence as the cause of the crisis.”290  With the 
collapse of the imperial machine and facing defeat on multiple frontiers in AD 260, Rome’s hope 
of survival was abysmal.  The concentration of a series of specific and sudden blows pushed the 
system of the empire “beyond the threshold of resilience.”291  The ancient Romans themselves 
were aware that they were living in a period of crisis, and that these changes “meant present 
collapse or future uncertainty for the empire.”292  Barbarian invasions, economic decline, civil 
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wars, climate change, and the pestilence all played a role in what some scholars refer to as the 
“first fall of Rome”293 at the end of the third century CE. 
While the Roman Empire collapsed under the pressures—both internal and external—that 
it faced in the third century CE, Rome was not going to give up without a fight.  Much to the 
amazement of modern scholars, Rome somehow (“almost surprising[ly]”294)  managed to 
reemerge from the ashes and rebuild itself in the fourth century. Diocletian, who ruled Rome as 
emperor from AD 284 to 305, put an end to the disastrous phase of Roman history regarded as 
the “Military Anarchy.”295  In an attempt to suppress civil war and political violence, Diocletian 
established a tetrarchy, in which four politicians collectively ruled and carried out the duties of 
emperor.  The political and economic reforms of Diocletian, and his successor Constantine, “set 
the scene for the Roman Empire’s comeback act.”296  The Mediterranean climate stabilized for 
the time being, and there were no major volcanic eruptions until the early fifth century.  Under 
Constantine’s rule, in 330, the capital of the Roman Empire was transferred from Rome to 
Byzantium, which was soon named Constantinople in Constantine’s honor.  In less than a 
century, Constantinople’s population multiplied ten-fold, from 30,000 to 300,000 residents.297  In 
the two centuries following the Cyprian Plague, under prudent leadership, propitious climate 
conditions, and reprieve from savage microbes, the Roman Empire was revitalized.  For the time 
being, at least. 
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THE JUSTINIANIC PLAGUE (541 CE) 
 
Background 
 In 470 CE, Germanic tribes sacked the city of Rome, overtaking the western portion of 
the Roman Empire.  By the end of the fifth century, the city of Rome was sparsely populated; a 
shadow of its former glory.  While Italy and much of the western Roman Empire had effectively 
become “frontier province[s],”298 the eastern Roman Empire had—at least for the time being—
managed to ward off external threats to its territories.  In the east, Constantinople, also referred 
to as ancient Byzantium, soon became the new capital and center of power of the Roman Empire.  
Although the eastern Mediterranean had become the empire’s new “heartland,”299 it is worth 
clarifying that the empire’s inhabitants continued to refer to themselves as Romans; “Byzantine” 
is merely “an intervention of early modern scholarship.”300  The eastern portion of the empire 
continued to tackle threats to its borders in every direction, the most formidable of which were 
the Persians and the Huns.  In 502, confrontation between the Roman Empire and Persia erupted 
into war.  The Huns, steppe-dwellers of central Asia and nomadic horsemen who also posed a 
threat to the security of the empire, were paid an annual indemnity in exchange for their peace.301 
Justinian, who ruled as emperor from 527 to 565, made peace with Persia and sought to 
reconquer the western territories that had formerly been part of the Roman Empire.  The first half 
of Justinian’s reign “was a flurry of action virtually unparalleled in Roman history.”302  In 
addition to Justinian’s armies successfully reclaiming large swaths of western territories, 
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Justinian reformed the bureaucracy of the empire, working tirelessly to make the legal and 
political systems of the empire more equitable and efficient than they were previously.303  
Justinian completely revised and codified all Roman law, an immense undertaking which had not 
previously been attempted.  He embarked on an ambitious building spree, commissioning the 
construction of more than thirty churches around Constantinople (including the resplendent 
Hagia Sophia), as well as the construction of bridges, and several underground cisterns to ensure 
a stable water supply for the people of Constantinople.  With the population of Constantinople 
approaching 500,000 individuals, “food security was nothing to take for granted.”304 As emperor, 
Justinian was obligated to feed his people, and he frequently traveled across the Roman world to 
inspect the state’s granaries.  For the first half of Justinian’s reign, ships traveling from 
Alexandria carried more than 300,000 liters of wheat to Constantinople per year.305  From 
Constantinople, grain was distributed by land and sea to distant areas across the Roman Empire.  
Granaries were omnipresent in the late Roman world, as it was believed important to stockpile 
large quantities of grain—as a mechanism to both feed those unable to afford it, as well as to 
provide a buffer in years where crops failed.  Rome’s network of granaries was a failsafe in time 
of famine, as grain could be dispersed to feed individuals anywhere in the empire. 
However, grain was not the only thing being transported across the Mediterranean seas 
on ships—or carted along roads—bound for distant areas of the Empire.  Somewhere along the 
way, something else had managed to hitch a ride:  the black rat (Rattus rattus).  This comes as 
little surprise given the omnipresence of rats in Constantinople and across the Roman Empire.  
Solid archaeological evidence for the prevalence of rats in the ancient Roman world has been 
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unearthed in recent years, in the form of gnawing marks on bones, rat remains in the pellets of 
owls and other predators, and rat remains “preserved in situ.”306  Constantinople itself has been 
coined a “rat paradise” by modern scholars because of its ample granaries and opportunities for 
rats to travel and reproduce.307  Left with an unlimited food supply, “rats proliferate 
famously.”308  As if the rats’ infiltration of the empire’s grain supply alone wasn’t sufficiently 
problematic (they consumed or damaged up to 15% of the grain supply they made their way 
into309), the rats were carrying a newly-mutated bacterium in their blood—Yersinia pestis.  
Before succumbing to disease themselves, black rats are able to store high concentrations of the 
Y. pestis bacterium in their bloodstreams, which, with the help of fleas, is quickly transmitted to 
adjacent human populations.  The fur of black rats is home to small fleas that drink their blood, 
the most common of which in the sixth century was the oriental rat flea (Xenopsylla cheopis).  
Fleas become infected after ingesting the blood of infected rats, and when fleas bite humans or 
other animals, they spread the infection—Bubonic Plague—to them.  
 
Origin, Timeline, and Geographical Reach 
 According to Procopius of Caesarea, the Bubonic plague epidemic, which has often been 
referred to as the Justinianic Plague, began in Pelusium, a Mediterranean port located on the 
easternmost branch of the Nile delta.310  Pelusium and Alexandria were the two major Egyptian 
ports on the Mediterranean, and both “communicated with the Nile through a network of 
canals.”311  The fact that the plague arrived in Pelusium in 541, prior to striking Alexandria, 
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suggests that it originated from the Red Sea, which is directly south of Pelusium.  Individuals 
contemporary with the outbreak of Bubonic plague, such as John of Ephesus and Evagrius 
Scholasticus, also traced the Plague of Justinian to the Red Sea.312  After the plague reached 
Pelusium, both the ancients and modern scholars agree that it diffused throughout the 
Mediterranean in both eastward (via Palestine and Levant) and westward (along the north 
African coast) directions, traveling along various trade routes.313  However, where the plague 
originated from prior to its arrival at the Red Sea continues to be a hot topic of debate among 
scholars.  Modern scientific findings and DNA analyses may go a long way in settling this 
debate.  
 Until recently, most historians believed that the Justinianic Plague originated from the 
Great Lakes region of Central Africa.  Peter Sarris, in 2002, concluded that “an African origin to 
the bubonic plague” was the most plausible “both chronologically and geopolitically.”314  More 
than a decade later, in 2013, A. D. Lee wrote that the 541 outbreak of Bubonic plague was likely 
to have come from Central Africa.315  However, while it is true that Yersinia pestis was endemic 
to the Great Lakes region of Central Africa prior to the sixth century, the specific strain of Y. 
pestis currently present in the Great Lakes region “is not the descendant of the germ that caused 
the first plague pandemic beginning in 542 CE,” according to George W. Sussman’s research 
published in 2015.316  After analyzing ancient DNA, Sussman concluded that the Y. pestis strain 
responsible for the Justinianic Plague originated in Asia rather than Africa.317  Thus, the specific 
strain of Y. pestis that caused the Plague of Justinian must have come to the Red Sea from the 
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East, as China was the birthplace of the pathogen.  In support of an Asian entry point, Tsiamis et 
al. write that “The suggestion that the port of Clysma [which is located due south of Pelusium], 
and no other port of the Red Sea, could have acted as the gateway of the plague is supported by a 
series of historical events.”318  Harper, too, argued that the plague originated from the uplands of 
western China, based on DNA evidence.319  Some scientists have yet to accept these new 
findings:  according to Mischa Meier in 2016, the debate surrounding whether the plague 
originated from Africa or China “remains open,” and at present “there is no absolute certainty to 
be had.”320  
 After arriving in Pelusium in 540, the Justinianic Plague emerged in Egypt in 541, 
diffusing across trade routes and eventually reaching Constantinople, Jerusalem, Antioch, and 
Syria in 542.  The plague entered Rome in late 543.  Coastal cities were hit “first and hardest,”321 
as the Y. pestis-infected rats first traveled by sea on ships sailing across the Mediterranean; soon 
they disembarked and were carted along the roads of the empire alongside grain.  As the plague 
spread across the Mediterranean world from 541-544, it eventually became endemic to the 
region, consequently flaring up in various waves in different areas for the next two centuries.322  
The first wave of Bubonic plague in Constantinople lasted until 544, whereupon Justinian issued 
Novel 122, “wherein he declared the plague’s ravage as terminated.”323  The subsequent waves 
occurred in the years:  558, 573, 590, 597, 618.324  After the 618 epidemic, sources describing 
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the outbreak of Bubonic plague become increasingly sparse; few records have survived in an 
interpretable form.325  Between 540 and 750, the Justinianic pandemic “recurred in some 18 
waves,”326 striking the capital at Constantinople every fifteen years on average for the first 
century of its outbreak.327  After 620, the plague only struck the capital every 64 years on 
average, which suggests the “waning dominance of Constantinople in the eastern 
Mediterranean,”328 as the city came to play an increasingly peripheral role in the region, and as a 
result, later outbreaks of Bubonic plague rarely made their way to the capital.  
 While the Mediterranean stood as the epicenter for outbreaks of Justinianic Plague, 
ancient sources evince that the plague traveled all over the known world:  to Spain, Gaul, the 
French-German border, Britain, and Ireland.  As stated by Michael W. Dols, “the pandemic 
engulfed the lands and peoples of the known world.”329  It struck large urban areas and distant 
countrysides alike.  Studies of various European countrysides from the sixth to eighth centuries 
indicate that “plague was as active there as in the cities.”330  As peasants comprised the majority 
of the Roman army, many brought the plague back home with them from war.  Moreover, heavy 
mortalities across the countryside may explain the severe manpower shortages that the army 
faced in the late sixth and seventh centuries.  
 The plague struck Spain first in 542 and again in 584.  It arrived in the British Isles in 544 
or 545, soon appearing in Ireland.  There are only two recorded instances of the plague having 
traveled to mainland England, both of which were described by the contemporary British author 
Bede:  664-666 and 684.331  Newly unearthed archaeological evidence suggests that the 
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Justinianic Plague made its way to areas beyond what has been observed in written records, i.e., 
Bavaria.  Less than two decades ago, researchers genotyped material from putative Justinianic 
Plague victims buried in a 6th century graveyard in Aschheim, which is located in Bavaria, 
Germany.  More than four hundred individuals were buried in the cemetery.332  Analyzing the 
dental pulp DNA of several skeletons buried in the cemetery, researchers found that some had 
been infected with Y. pestis bacteria, a discovery which confirmed Y. pestis’ role as the causative 
agent of the Justinianic Plague.333  Moreover, the fact that Y. pestis journeyed through transalpine 
Europe—to a region for which there is no written documentation indicating the presence of 
Bubonic plague—suggests that the Bubonic plague may have stretched far beyond the 
geographical boundaries that have previously been established for the disease purely on the basis 
of written evidence from the time.  
 
The Role of Climate  
 While the Mediterranean climate had been relatively tranquil and stable in the years 
leading up to Justinian’s rule, in 526 climatic conditions began to degenerate rapidly.  In 526, an 
earthquake in Antioch claimed the lives of more than a quarter of a million people.  A decade 
later, in 536, the sky went dark for more than a year:  John of Ephesus wrote that “the sun 
became dark and its darkness lasted for one and a half years … the fruits did not ripen, and the 
wine tasted like sour grapes.”334  Procopius provided a similar account, writing that “the sun 
gave forth its light without brightness, like the moon, during this whole year.”335  Witnesses as 
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distant as eastern China chronicle the same observations recorded by the Roman eyewitnesses.336  
While some debate has persisted as to whether the dust veil that darkened the skies of the 
northern hemisphere was caused by volcanic eruptions or the impact of a comet, the detrimental 
environmental impacts of the cloud on Roman society are clear.  
 According to scholars like Antii Arjava, “the dust veil has been declared the worst 
climatic disaster in recorded times.”337  Temperatures fell between 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius, 
making the decade from 536 to 545 the coldest on record in the past two millennia.338  Crops 
failed and people starved.  Both people and animals began to migrate in search of food, venturing 
beyond their typical radii of travel.  Animals began to move in unusual migratory patterns.339  It 
is possible that the behavioral changes in animals that were caused by such unexpected and 
unprecedented climate change may also have been responsible for bringing Bubonic plague to 
the Mediterranean world in the first place.  Changing temperatures and precipitation may have 
prompted rodents carrying Y. pestis to abandon their habitats, possibly triggering “an epizootic 
that reached the rodents of the seaborne trade routes heading west.”340 
 The famine triggered by the lack of crops that would grow under worsening climate 
conditions may also have contributed to the spread of the plague; as grain had to be transported 
from granaries across the empire to remote villages, the infected rats who had climbed aboard 
arrived with the grain, thereby spreading the plague even further.  While these changes to the 
Mediterranean climate, caused by unusual geological—and perhaps meteorological—activity, 
stretched resources thin and wrought havoc across the agricultural and zoological landscape, in 
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and of themselves they did not elicit social collapse or state failure.  Instead, they piled stress 
onto an economy whose finances and resources had already been strained by years of intense 
warfare on multiple fronts.  
 
Symptoms, Ancient Medicine, and Modern Medical Assessment 
The symptomologies of Justinianic Plague described by various contemporary authors are 
markedly similar, matching classic symptoms of Bubonic plague:  fever, and buboes in areas 
near the lymph nodes.  Unlike with respect to the three earlier epidemics described in this paper, 
there is little debate regarding the modern diagnosis of the Justinianic Plague.  Modern scholars 
overwhelmingly concur that Bubonic plague is the culprit.341  The plague reared its head in three 
different forms:  bubonic, pneumonic, and septic.  Historians and scientists concur that Y. pestis 
was the bacterium responsible for the plague, and archaeological evidence from the time 
supports this conclusion.  Thus, according to Robert Sallares, the main point of uncertainty 
regarding the symptoms of the Justinianic Plague is “the relative importance of the bubonic, 
pneumonic, and septicemic forms of the disease.”342   
The bubonic form of the plague occurred when an individual was bit by a flea infected 
with the Y. pestis bacterium.  The individual’s lymphatic system, in an attempt to purge the body 
of the bacterium, drained it into nearby lymph nodes, where the bacterium then dodged the 
body’s immune response and replicated rapidly.343  Individuals bitten by an infected flea became 
symptomatic within three to five days, quickly developing a fever, chills, and a headache.344  
About a day later, buboes began to form on their skin, typically near individuals’ armpits, ears, 
 
341 Sallares, “Ecology, Evolution, and Epidemiology of Plague,” 240. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Harper, The Fate of Rome, 222. 
344 Ibid. 
75 
thighs, or groin.  Some had bloody and swollen eyes, a sore throat, or diarrhea.  Death was 
imminent after the pustules on an individual’s skin turned black.  
The Y. pestis bacterium could also be transmitted via aerosol droplets expelled by 
infected individuals.  The incubation period of pneumonic plague was shorter than bubonic, 
lasting only 2-3 days.  Victims became sick with bronchitis and pneumonia, experiencing fever, 
chest pain, and a bloody cough.  Pneumonic plague was even more fatal than plague in its 
bubonic form—the former having a case fatality rate approaching 100%, while the latter had a 
fatality rate of around 80 percent.345   
In other cases, the Y. pestis bacterium skipped the lymphatic route of the infected 
altogether, and instead traveled directly into the bloodstream.   Individuals infected with 
septicemic plague died of “overwhelming sepsis” even before signs of the disease presented 
themselves externally, often collapsing dead within hours of initial infection.346  The few 
individuals who managed to survive the Justinianic Plague were left with long-lasting and 
debilitating side effects, ranging from gangrene to brain damage, which could result in a “violent 
delirium.”347  And, having survived one round of the plague did not even guarantee immunity 
from future infection: for most, the plague bacterium conferred “only partial and temporary 
immunity.”348 
 While there exists no record of a Galen-equivalent doctor during the Justinianic Plague, 
there were a few notable changes in medical care that occurred in response to the outbreak of the 
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Physicians conducted autopsies of the bodies of those who had died from the plague and lanced 
the bubonic swellings of the corpses.  They discovered that something strange had grown inside 
(likely the remains of swollen, hemorrhaged lymph nodes), yet their medical understanding was 
so slim that these investigations did little to advance their understanding of the plague or its 
spread.350  According to one historian contemporary with the plague, doctors “were at a complete 
loss concerning the circumstances of the pest.”351  Thus, while the plague invited a clinical 
examination, which many doctors engaged in, such examination unfortunately “yielded little 
benefit to scientific medicine.”352 
 
Analysis of Contemporary Accounts  
 A wide range of sources—written by authors contemporary with the Plague of 
Justinian— from various geographical, social, and cultural perspectives have survived.  The 
three most detailed contemporary descriptions are those of Procopius of Caesarea, John of 
Ephesus, and Evagrius Scholasticus.  Procopius reported the symptoms of the plague 
methodically and in a “true classicising style” that echoes Thucydides’ 431 BCE account of the 
Plague of Athens.353  John of Ephesus, a Syrian monk who traveled through Palestine, Syria, 
Mesopotamia, and Asia Minor during the plague, provided an emotional account and religious 
interpretation of the disease’s outbreak.354  Finally Evagrius Scholasticus, a church historian and 
secretary to Patriarch Gregory of Antioch, offered a personal account of the suffering caused by 
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the disease, as most of his household fell ill and eventually succumbed to the Justinianic 
Plague.355  
 In the absence of germ theory, the arrival and cause of the Justinianic Plague baffled 
contemporary authors.  Many turned to religion in search of an explanation:  Procopius wrote 
that “it is impossible to conceive in thought any explanation, except indeed to refer it to God.”356  
John of Ephesus viewed the plague as divine chastisement, writing that God’s anger had fallen 
upon cities like a “wine-press and pitilessly trampled and squeezed all their inhabitants within 
them like fine grapes.”357  Yet, as the plague attacked the pious and impious alike, religion 
became a dissatisfying explanation.  The majority of Evagrius’ household having died from the 
plague proved “enough to lead even a churchman into doubt,” as he openly questioned whether 
or not God was just.358  Procopius, writing around 550 CE, seems to have considered a more 
scientific analysis as well, listing “the variables that could be excluded as causal factors: 
geography, ethnicity, season, gender, age, habitat, lifestyle, temperament, activities.”359  
 
Mortality Estimates 
Across the Mediterranean world, and in Constantinople in particular, people dropped 
dead from disease almost instantaneously.  The vast scale of deaths quickly proved previously 
accepted corpse disposal practices to be impractical and inadequate.  Dead bodies filled the 
streets, piling up “without enough survivors left to bury them.”360  Corpses were left on the 
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streets for days before they were finally collected for burial.361  The putrid stench of death wafted 
throughout the city.  With mortality rates at an unprecedented high, traditional burial practices 
were soon abandoned.  According to John of Ephesus, “no one ventured outside without an 
identity tag,”362 as individuals feared they would be left unburied if they died while out and 
about.  The wealthy took matters into their own hands, violating the tombs of individuals who 
had been buried prior to the outbreak of plague in order to bury their own dead in their place.363  
Burial customs, such as the simultaneous burial of multiple bodies in larger graves, which had 
been “very hard to document” prior to the sixth century, became commonplace.364  As corpses 
continued to be heaped into stacks on the streets or tossed into the waterways, Justinian was 
forced to intervene, appointing a man named Theodore as imperial official to organize the 
collection and disposal of the dead.  Justinian also arranged for mass burial pits (each could 
accommodate around 70,000 bodies) to be dug at Sycae, a suburb of Constantinople.365 
Mortalities were so high that, according to Procopius, gravediggers removed the roofs of the 
towers that comprised the wall surrounding the Constantinopolitan suburb of Galata in 542, and 
stacked corpses into each tower before reattaching the roofs.366  We are told that the stench was 
insufferable. 
 The lack of demographical data from the sixth-century Roman Empire has made it 
difficult to estimate the overall mortality of the 542 epidemic and its subsequent—more poorly 
attested—outbreaks.  Eyewitnesses emphasized heavy death tolls:  John of Ephesus wrote that, at 
the height of the plague in Constantinople, more than 16,000 individuals were dying per day, and 
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that the men standing outside the gates of Constantinople stopped counting the number of 
corpses taken for burial after the tally reached 230,000.367  Procopius wrote that the mortality of 
the Justinianic Plague exceeded 10,000 per day, proclaiming that “the whole human race came 
near to being annihilated.”368  Modern scholars caution against the urge to take these ancient 
estimates at face value; Mischa Meier argues that “the intention of the authors probably was not 
to provide a precise quantitative record in the modern sense but rather primarily to convey the 
quality of the event, the monstrousness of its dimensions.”369  
 Thus, while an exact measure of the death toll has continued to elude modern scholars, 
most agree that a reasonable estimate for the mortality rate of the Justinianic Plague lies 
somewhere between 30 and 60 percent.  Josiah C. Russell has hypothesized that the Justinianic 
Plague caused a 40-50 percent drop in the population of the eastern Roman Empire between the 
years 541 and 600.370  According to John of Ephesus, mortality in Constantinople was higher 
than in any other city or countryside of the empire.371  Given Constantinople’s status as a center 
for commerce and culture—as the largest and most cosmopolitan city of the Roman Empire—
scholars tend to agree with John’s assessment.  With an estimated population of around half a 
million individuals in 540, an assumed 50-60 percent mortality rate in Constantinople for the 
first wave of Justinianic Plague, 250,000-300,000 fatalities would fall in line with the better-
known death rates of the Black Death, another episode of Bubonic Plague that struck Eurasia in 
the fourteenth century.372  Both P. Allen and Ann Gibbons have posited that the bubonic plague 
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wiped out ⅓ to ½ of the population of the eastern Roman Empire.373  According to Michael S. 
Rosenwald, the Justinianic Plague is believed to have caused somewhere between thirty and fifty 
millions deaths between 541 and 750 CE.374  While scholars do not entirely agree on the exact 
figure or range of mortality, Meier points out that if the fatality of the Justinianic Plague 
occurred “on anything even approaching” a scale of 25 percent, “it must inevitably have had 




 The seemingly infinite cycle of natural disaster and disease had a tempestuous 
psychological effect on many individuals.  Demographic decline resulting from a combination of 
recurring waves of plague and natural disaster greatly changed the landscape of the empire as the 
Romans had once known it:  in Pope Gregory’s Rome (c. 590 AD), there many have been as few 
as 10,000-20,000 individuals living in the city, which “would barely have filled a corner of the 
Colosseum.”376 
 Traditional social order collapsed.  The indiscriminatory and unpredictable nature of the 
plague, which killed some while sparing others, and extinguished entire villages while leaving 
neighboring towns completely unscathed for no clear reason, drove contemporaries mad.  In 
some cities, post-traumatic stress disorder gave way to mass hysteria:  ancient authors recount a 
“collective madness” that struck several cities—Constantinople, Constantina, Edessa, Carrhae, 
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Martyropolis, and Amida—in 560.377  “Full-blown mass hysteria” arose in Constantinople.378  
Individuals “howled”379 and took flight whenever they encountered a monk, priest, or other 
religious official, as they suspected them of being “death incarnate.”380  Rumor and hysteria ran 
rampant; according to John of Ephesus, “a sane person could no longer be found easily.”381  The 
Life of St. Theodore of Sikyeon, written about the Byzantine Saint, “contains numerous tales of 
the saint exorcising demons when whole communities became possessed.”382  Each subsequent 
wave of plague for the next two centuries brought with it recurring waves of hysteria, 
devastation, and instability; Lester K. Little writes that “the challenge for leaders everywhere 
was to keep communities together.”383 
 Demographic settlement patterns across urban and rural areas of the empire shifted in 
response to mass mortality and rapidly changing economic conditions.  The persistence of the 
plague for two centuries created “a prolonged epoch of demographic stagnation.”384  The 
population of the Roman Empire contracted and did not rebound for several centuries.  Building 
projects across the empire all but ceased in the wake of the 541 outbreak of plague.385  While 
archaeological records from the time are scant, it is clear that the earthquake of 526 and 
subsequent earthquakes inflicted devastating damage on architectural sites across the empire.  
Although the evidence that has survived may be insufficient to conclude with absolute certainty 
that individuals left highly populated plague-infested areas and relocated to the countryside, “it 
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may well point to that,” according to Hugh N. Kennedy.386  An archaeological survey of the 
main houses in Apamea—the capital of Syria II—has discovered that, by the end of the sixth-
century, all but one of the houses “had been deserted or at least were in a state of decay.”387  This 
was likely due to some combination of earthquake damage, plague, and the Persian conquests of 
573.  In Kennedy’s opinion, the sixth-century archaeological evidence that has been unearthed in 




Despite the continuity of “Roman” terminology with which the residents of the empire 
used to refer to themselves and their lands, decades had passed since the city of Rome itself was 
truly the center of the empire.389  The character of the Roman Empire had fundamentally 
changed, as Rome was “now a strongly Christianised society.”390  Imperial campaigns in the 
decades prior to the outbreak of the Bubonic plague had sought to purge the empire of paganism 
and persuade—at times through the use of force—individuals to convert to Christianity.  John of 
Ephesus, for example, alongside “gangs of monks,” raided pagan villages in Asia Minor and 
destroyed pagan altars and temples.391  As the mortality of the Justinianic Plague continued to 
climb, and as individuals died ubiquitously, the “full apocalyptical potential” of the religious 
atmosphere was triggered.392  Many believed the end was near; no amount of prayer or religious 
devotion (to any religion) could save an individual from imminent death.  
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 The first distinctive religious response to the plague was repaganization, whereby many 
Christians reverted to worship of the pagan gods.  Presuming that the Christian God had done 
nothing to spare their communities from suffering or death, some turned and prayed to the old 
pagan gods in search of their protection.  Unfortunately, this not only attracted the ire of the 
primarily Christian imperial authorities, but it also did nothing to protect the people from the 
plague:  John of Ephesus described how “the plague-afflicted residents of a Palestinian village 
briefly reverted to the worship of pagan images and received terrible punishment from God.”393 
While some Christians turned to paganism, another popular religious response was to 
worship saints and other holy figures within the Christian faith with the hope that they might 
“intercede with God for the cessation of the scourge and cure them of it.”394  As prayers to the 
Christian God were unsuccessful, they caused some individuals to lose faith in “traditional 
guardians” of the Christian religion.395  Rather than calling the entire religion into doubt, 
individuals instead attempted to “place their salvation in the hands of new protectors.”396  
Worship of the Virgin Mary increased again, as it had in the wake of the Cyprian Plague.  This is 
evidenced by the transformation of an annual festival—which had historically been held in honor 
of Christ—to a festival in celebration of the Virgin in 542, “expressly as a measure to alleviate 
the plague.”397  Although Christians had hitherto rejected it in every form, because they viewed it 
as a perpetuation of pagan religious practices, icons of venerated saints and religious figures 
“began to appear abundantly” in private and public spaces in the second half of the sixth 
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century.398  The timing of this uptick in iconolatry directly coincides with the exogenous 
disasters that afflicted the eastern Roman empire during this time.  
 An intensification in Christian piety in response to the Justinianic Plague also manifested 
itself in the continuation of church construction projects throughout times of economic scarcity, 
as well as through a spectacular increase in monasticism.  In the two centuries during which the 
plague swept through the empire, church construction became the “most active form of public 
construction.”399  More monasteries were built with increased capacity to accommodate a larger 
number of monks.400  Without any sense of germ theory, practices of monastic life created 
conditions ripe for disease spread.  John Maddicott writes that “there could hardly have been a 
more innocently lethal act of charity than the kiss of peace” that Abbot Eosterwine gave every 
monk of the Wearmouth monastery as he lay dying of Bubonic plague in 686.401  More than 
simply providing a passive arena for the plague’s spread within the residential structure, 
however, monks’ frequent visits to nearby villages are likely to have spread the disease far 
beyond the physical boundaries of the monastery.   
According to Jo N. Hays, the period of the Justinianic Plague was “an age of shifting 
religious domination and contested grounds” between Christianity, paganism, Judaism, and 
Islam.402  During the time that Bubonic plague was endemic to Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran (from the late sixth century CE onwards), Islam began to spread through these regions.  As 
the plague severely weakened the eastern portion of the Roman Empire and accelerated the 
decline of the Persian Empire, it scarcely afflicted the nomadic Arab tribes—many of which had 
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converted to Islam—who were traveling through these regions, typically through desert-like 
terrain.403  Thus, while the rest of the population was relatively stationary during the various 
outbursts of Bubonic plague, Islamic nomadic tribes continued to travel throughout the Middle 
East and shared their religious beliefs with those they encountered, and as a result were able to 
spread their religion.  
 
Political Changes 
 While the first decade of Justinian’s reign—prior to the arrival of Bubonic plague—was 
remarkably successful and prosperous, his administration grappled with “a preponderance of 
setbacks”404 in the years following the outbreak of plague.  Justinian’s ambitious programs of 
reform and military conquests, which may very well have been successful under normal 
circumstances, were complicated by natural disaster, plague, and consecutive years of bad 
harvests.  According to Harper, the 540 plague inaugurated “what has been called ‘the other age 
of Justinian.”405  Although Justinian’s personal character, work ethic, and proactivity were 
exemplary by all measures, the critical question, according to Lee, “is whether his initiatives and 
efforts ultimately benefited the empire or not.”406  Extensive military campaigning exhausted 
imperial financial reserves, making the treasury desperate for revenue.  The high death toll 
merely added to the burden.  Thus, while Justinian may have wanted to restore the greatness of 
the Roman empire by seeking to evoke large societal change and reconquering territories that 
had previously been the core of the empire, his ambitious programs further complicated the 
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issues that the state faced from the exogenous events of the 540s.  Justinian’s reign “trundled 
forward in the shadow of pestilence.”407  His rule came to be defined by the grave exogenous 
events that occurred during his time as emperor, which he could do little to mitigate the damage 
of.  This, along with a “series of unfortunate events”408 late in Justinian’s reign, such as food 
shortages, protests, assassination attempts, and natural disasters, caused contemporaries to regard 
him contemptively and often harshly criticize his leadership and apparent poor control of the 
Roman state.409  
 
Economic Impact 
 Economic life across the empire—and in Constantinople in particular—came grounding 
to a halt.  Across the countrysides of the empire, grapes rotted on the vine, herds went untended, 
and crops unharvested.  With few individuals left who were either willing or able to work, 
buying and selling all but ceased.410  Marketplaces closed after running out of food.  According 
to Allen, the primary effects of the 542 outbreak of Bubonic plague were “famine and 
inflation.”411  In an economy that was primarily agricultural, the dire lack of agrarian labor at 
harvest time “had disastrous consequences.”412  The agricultural challenges the Romans faced 
were exacerbated by the fact that the pestilence was not confined to humans:  it attacked and 
killed off cattle and other animals, further contributing to food shortages and hindering 
production.  As labor had become increasingly scarce while demand rose, “tradesmen, artisans, 
and agricultural workers” began to demand prices and wages two to three times more than what 
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had previously been considered the norm.413  Justinian was quick to respond, introducing price 
control legislation in 545 and urging employers to pay workers their customary wages rather than 
the newly-inflated rates.  
 The government’s demand for tax revenue remained constant in the wake of the 
Justinianic Plague, as the physical size of the empire and demands made on the state by warfare 
on multiple frontiers had remained the same.  However, the imperial need for tax revenue 
quickly proved to be problematic; as the taxpayer base of the empire had contracted significantly 
due to plague mortalities, the average individual tax burden increased considerably.  Justinian 
made no taxation concessions to landowners, despite the fact that many were already suffering 
financially as a result of the epidemic.414  The imperial taxation program proved so burdensome 
that some farmers fled to escape paying taxes on their unproductive land.415  Justinian’s 
response?  Landowners were soon required to pay annual taxes on both their own land, as well as 
on plots of neighboring land that had been abandoned.416  Such a taxation policy devastated the 
poorer landholding classes, while working to the advantage of the wealthy, who could not only 
afford to pay their increased tax obligations but also stood to gain financially from increased 
assets and owning more land that they could work and turn a profit on.  As stated by John 
Atkinson, the chaotic economic conditions brought about by the plague created “the potential for 
both the enrichment of the wealthy who survived, and some measure of redistribution of 
wealth.”417  Yet even the financial position of the wealthy was not particularly stable.  Sudden, 
widespread death threw the inheritance system into disarray.  And, in a formerly advanced 
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economy with modern financial credit systems, “banks were desperate to enforce debt 
obligations on successors.”418 
 Pinched for revenue, the Roman state overhauled the imperial currency system.  Around 
542-3, a time period that coincides with the “first ravages”419 of the Bubonic plague, Justinian 
issued a series of lightweight solidi coins, many of which weighed 20 siliquae (24 had previously 
been customary).420  It is likely that the administration minted poorer-quality gold and copper 
coins in response to the drastic fall in state revenues.  Michael Metcalf’s study concluded that, 
between the years of 538 and 551, the weight of copper coinage minted throughout the empire 
decreased by nearly 25 percent.421  The cumulative blow of multiple waves of plague had a 
debilitating impact on Ancient Rome’s state finances and financial systems.  Justinian’s 
successor—Justin II, who reigned from 565 to 578—lamented the “exhausted” and debt-
burdened treasury he had inherited.422  The financial crisis became so great that imperial 
authorities had no choice but to reduce military pay by 25 percent in 588.423  Rome’s inability to 
finance and pay its military to the same extent as it had prior to the outbreak of plague quickly 
proved to be problematic as the empire faced threats from neighboring territories on multiple 
fronts.  
 
Impact on Military 
 Justinian’s crusades to reconquer the western territories of the empire—while initially 
successful—stretched thin the financial resources and military capacity of the Roman Empire.  
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Given the close living quarters soldiers experienced in camps, the Roman armies sustained “the 
maximum mortality rate” from the Justinianic Plague.424  The disruption that the epidemic of the 
540s caused to Rome’s military campaigns was enormous:  imperial commanders struggled with 
manpower shortages and an inability to pay even the scant number of troops they were able to 
rally.  In 552, Justinian’s armies managed to defeat Totila, thereby regaining control of Italy.425  
But Justinian did not stop there.  He continued to campaign across the western Mediterranean, 
sending troops to fight the Moors in North Africa and intervening in a civil war in Spain.426  
Earlier in his reign, many of Justinian’s peace treaties stipulated monetary payments from the 
Roman imperial treasury to areas that posed a threat to the Empire.  However, in the aftermath of 
the Justinianic Plague, this tactic proved to be unsustainable; Lee argues that while Justinian’s 
monetary payments were successful in the short-term, they may have handicapped the empire’s 
military strategy and resources in the long term, as the fiscal crises brought about by the plague 
made it difficult for the empire to afford the sums it had agreed to pay to its enemies during a 
time of relative economic prosperity and stability.427  
 Justinian’s commitment of imperial forces to multiple theatres of war created a 
predicament.  After the Justinianic Plague, the state could neither field the army that its vast 
domain and multiple fronts of perpetual warfare required, nor could it afford to pay such an 
army.  Debasing the currency—a gambit often used by other leaders at times when state finances 
were pressed—was no longer an option, as gold currency had become the “gold standard” and 
was now the only form of payment troops accepted.428  According to Harper, in times of 
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financial duress, the state had two options:  either to withhold pay from soldiers, or to squeeze 
taxpayers.429  During the 540s, the empire often did both.  In the 570s, Roman Emperor Tiberius 
II was forced to resort to desperate enlistment campaigns across the empire to increase the size of 
the army.  In 588, imperial authorities formally reduced military pay by 25 percent.  
 The initial outbreak of Bubonic plague in the 540s and subsequent outbreaks severely 
debilitated the eastern Roman Empire and the might of its military forces.  The mortality and 
fiscal crisis occasioned by the plague severely weakened the empire “in the decades leading up 
to the final dramatic phase of Byzantine-Persian warfare in the early seventh century,” according 
to Sarris.430  In 626, the Persians, having conquered much of the Eastern Roman Empire, made 
their ways to the walls of Constantinople.  With the capture of Constantinople, along with large 
swaths of eastern territories, the “last great zone of energy” of the Roman Empire was lost.431  
The Mediterranean world as Rome had once known it was no more—the empire was spliced into 
smaller pieces which were claimed by various surrounding leaders.  Such severe geopolitical 
losses caused Rome to morph into “a Byzantine rump state whose straggled possessions were 
meager and impoverished.”432  The noxious combination of mortality and financial crisis fueled 
by the Justinianic Plague made it impossible for Rome to defend the many frontiers of the empire 
against outside intruders.   
 
Conclusion 
 In spite of heavy mortalities, military losses, political change, social upheaval, and 
economic hardship—brought about by the Antonine and Cyprian Plagues—the Roman Empire 
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managed to rebuild itself and make a miraculous recovery in the centuries that followed.  
Justinian’s rule marked the beginning of an era rife with possibility; that, with a few strategic 
military campaigns, Rome might regain its glory and status as a Mediterranean superpower.  
These dreams were swept away when disease struck in 542.  The damage resulting from the 
Justinianic Plague was both disastrous and far-reaching.  By the end of the sixth century, Rome 
was a shadow of her former self, more than a third of the empire’s population had succumbed to 
disease.  Grave mortality and economic instability brought about by the plague halted all hopes 
of reconquest or restoration of the “old” Roman Empire.  There was simply not enough money or 
manpower to continue with the aggressive military campaigns that had commenced under 
Justinian’s rule.  Imperial attempts to ward off threats in multiple directions simultaneously to 
preserve Rome’s territorial footprint further weakened the empire.  In the end, Rome’s extensive 
and aggressive military prowess—which had facilitated the empire’s unparalleled territorial 













 History and the human experience are inextricably linked to the climate and ecology of 
our planet.  Often overlooked, pathogens and infectious diseases have profoundly impacted 
societies across the world for millennia.  In particular, the four major ancient epidemics explored 
in this paper wrought immense destruction across the known world.  Individually and 
cumulatively, the unrelenting pathogens responsible—some with mortality rates above 25 
percent—gave rise to conditions that ultimately contributed to the collapse of two of the world’s 
greatest empires:  Athens and Rome.   Economies suffered, military regimes collapsed, and 
political turmoil ensued.  Changing climate conditions precipitated or exacerbated outbreaks of 
infectious disease and created agricultural and economic hardships that, in turn, were further 
exacerbated by the outbreak of plague.  Societies stricken by disease sought explanations for 
their suffering, turning to new religions or religious practices in pursuit of answers that religion 
could not provide.  
 For over 2,000 years, the legacies left by the ancient Athenian and Roman empires have 
inspired awe.  Athens and Rome were centers of scientific and philosophical inquiry, political 
theory, and technological innovation.  They were the birthplace of progressive systems of 
government and finance that served as models for many other countries.  With geographical 
footprints that, at times, exceeded the boundaries of the entire Mediterranean, they were hotbeds 
of international trade, diplomacy, and triumphant architectural and infrastructure achievements.  
Despite lacking the transportation or communication technologies we possess today, the ancient 
Athenians and Romans managed to extend and redefine the commercial, political, and 
intellectual horizons of their respective empires.   
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Yet, in their quest to further expand their power by conquering and colonizing territories 
across the Mediterranean and beyond, the ancient Greeks and Romans also may have unleashed 
a Pandora’s box of pandemics.  Increased travel, migration, and exploration facilitated—and also 
intensified—the spread of infectious diseases to nonimmune populations across the known 
world.  Ancient philosophers had made revolutionary discoveries in mathematics, astronomy, 
and engineering.  But when it came to plague, they were helpless; the spread of infectious 
disease was a matter they simply failed to understand.  It took only one plague to tear down 
Athens.  Rome managed to resist the formidable force of infectious disease twice:  despite 
suffering heavy mortalities from both the Antonine and Cyprian Plagues, the empire—much to 
the astonishment of modern scholars—managed to repopulate, re-stabilize its economy, and 
reconquer lost territories.  But even the most resilient empire could only sustain so much; with 
each subsequent wave of plague, Rome’s efforts to rebuild were reversed.  With the Justinianic 
Plague, nature’s destructive force rained down, ultimately pushing one of the world’s greatest 
empires to the brink of collapse. 
 While the Plague of Athens, the Antonine Plague, the Cyprian Plague, and the Plague of 
Justinian were the four worst outbreaks of infectious disease known to have occurred in ancient 
times, they are far from the only widescale outbreaks of infectious disease to have occurred 
throughout history.  A quick Google search unearths, among other things, a list of “20 of the 
worst epidemics and pandemics in history,” many of which had death tolls in the hundreds of 
thousands, others in the millions.433  For centuries after the Justinianic Plague, microbes and 
viruses have continued to be formidable forces to reckon with.  In the absence of Germ theory, 
there was little that could be done to mitigate their damage, as “there was no scientific reason to 
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fear the infected.”434  It was not until the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century that 
scientific discovery and innovation began to provide solutions for controlling infectious disease 
outbreaks.  In 1762, Austrian physician Marcus Antonius von Plenciz published a book in which 
he outlined a Germ theory of disease; yet it took another century for his theory to become widely 
accepted.  At the turn of the nineteenth century, the first vaccine was developed.  Only in the past 
three centuries have scientists managed to develop vaccines, antibiotics, and other therapeutic 
treatments to combat a range of infectious diseases that were previously considered deadly.  
“The great triumph of our species,” stressed Harper, “is the control of infectious diseases.”435  As 
a society, we have clung to a “persistent illusion of control”436 of infectious disease, as we are 
now able to prevent and treat many infectious diseases that afflicted mankind in previous 
decades and centuries.  Yet, as evidenced by the emergence of a “terrifying roster” of infectious 
diseases, ranging from HIV and Ebola to West Nile and SARs, “nature’s creative destruction is 
far from spent,” wrote Harper in 2018.437 
Then came COVID-19.  Scientists are still learning about the ways in which the virus 
spreads and affects the human body.  In the absence of an effective vaccine or treatment, we are 
currently living through a pandemic which we cannot yet prevent or cure.  At this juncture, it 
may be tempting to look to the experiences of the ancient Greeks and Romans for insight.  There 
are significant commonalities between the consequences of COVID-19 and the four major 
ancient epidemics, including anxiety surrounding the unknown, social upheaval, economic 
decline, and the exacerbation of racial and socioeconomic inequalities.   
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Outbreaks of infectious disease have been, and likely will continue to be, inevitable.  
Modern technology, international travel, global supply chains, urbanization, and population 
growth may even exacerbate the speed and extent of their spread.  But, compared to people 
living in ancient times, we are in a much better position today to contend with these pathogens, 
pernicious as they may be.  DNA sequencing and international collaboration among scientists 
enabled identification of the virus responsible for the current outbreak in record time and will—
hopefully—speed the development of multiple vaccines, anti-virals, and other treatments to 
combat this and any future outbreaks.  Modern medicine has helped, and will continue to help, 
many infected individuals to survive and recover.  Unlike the ancient Greeks and Romans, we 
have the tools to determine how a given disease is transmitted, and what measures (e.g., face 
masks and social distancing) are needed to mitigate its spread.   
Mark Twain once wrote that “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”  But with 
the tools at our disposal, in the case of COVID-19, history need not repeat itself—or even rhyme.  
The mortality rate of COVID-19 (estimated to be somewhere between 3-4%)438 pales in 
comparison to the mortality rates of ancient pandemics (approximately 10-80%).  While it is 
premature to attempt to predict the long-term economic, social, and religious consequences of 
the current pandemic, given the unique advantage we have over our ancestors—knowledge in 
medicine, genetics, and epidemiology—there’s reason to be optimistic that the current pandemic 
will be less consequential than these ancient pandemics, as long as political leaders and citizens 
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Faculty rating: 4 
Faculty statement: Natasha’s extensive consideration of four major ancient Mediterranean 
plagues and their cultural implications is a quite remarkable example of (truly) independent 
research by a rising sophomore History major - she would be an entirely deserving recipient of 
LURA recognition from The Claremont Colleges Library. Originally conceived for (and 
subsequently supported by) Pomona’s Summer 2020 RAISE Program, “Politics of Plague: 
Ancient Epidemics & Their Impact on Society” draws widely and insightfully on the relevant 
ancient and modern sources to provide both an introductory overview and a compelling analysis 
of these horrifically destructive episodes. Although I had worked very happily with Natasha 
during her first (Fall 2019) semester in my HIST 8 Heroes and Heroines in the Ancient 
Mediterranean and subsequently saw Pomona History award her the Learnihan Prize for best 
first-year performance in ancient and medieval history, I was nonetheless astonished in August 
when - two months after our last conversation - she sent me this final draft of her Summer 2020 
research. My initial astonishment about the length - right around 100 pages, that of a very solid 
year-long undergraduate thesis - was subsequent augmented by astonishment at the methodical 
yet compelling manner in which Natasha, inspired by our own COVID tragedy, had immersed 
herself in the sources and presented her comparative study of these ancient epidemics. Although 
Natasha remains understandably indebted to the earlier work of scholars such as Walter Scheidel 
and Kyle Harper, she has delivered an excellent synthesis and analysis of the source materials, 
and - against the backdrop of COVID - has done so in an incredibly timely way. I very much 
look forward to seeing how her further research into this topic deepens and advances her 
understanding of these ancient plagues and their contemporary relevance (perhaps a subsequent 
thesis / LURA submission in a couple years’ time?), and for now warmly commend her “Politics 
of Plague” submission to this year’s sophomore LURA competition. 
 
